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We present a rootkit prevention system, namely DARK that tracks suspicious Linux 
loadable kernel modules (LKM) at a granular level by using on-demand emulation, a 
technique that dynamically switches a running system between virtualized and 
emulated execution. Combining the strengths of emulation and virtualization, DARK 
is able to thoroughly capture the activities of the target module in a guest operating 
system (OS), while maintaining reasonable run-time performance. To address 
integrity-violation and confidentiality-violation rootkits, we create a group of security 
policies that can detect all available Linux rootkits. It is shown that normal guest OS 
performance is unaffected. The performance is only decreased when rootkits attempt 
to run, while most rootkits are detected at installation. 
Next, we present a sandbox-based malware analysis system called Rkprofiler that 
dynamically monitors and analyzes the behavior of Windows kernel malware. Kernel 
malware samples run inside a virtual machine (VM) that is supported and managed by 
a PC emulator. Rkprofiler provides several capabilities that other malware analysis 
systems do not have. First, it can detect the execution of malicious kernel code 
regardless of how the monitored kernel malware is loaded into the kernel and whether 
it is packed or not. Second, it captures all function calls made by the kernel malware 
and constructs call graphs from the trace files. Third, a technique called aggressive 
memory tagging (AMT) is proposed to track the dynamic data objects that the kernel 
malware visits.  Last, Rkprofiler records and reports the hardware access events of 
kernel malware (e.g., MSR register reads and writes). Our evaluation results show that 
Rkprofiler can quickly expose the security-sensitive activities of kernel malware and 









Despite years of research in kernel malware detection, kernel malware (rootkits) 
remains a significant threat to today’s Internet security. In fact, most of the legacy 
systems today, like Windows XP and many Linux distributions, don’t have 
capabilities for preventing the invasions of kernel malware once hackers acquire root 
privilege and deploy them. Realizing the seriousness of the issue, people have 
proposed several intrusion prevention approaches to thwart kernel malware. For 
example, Microsoft 64-bit Windows Server 2008 only allows signed device drivers to 
load into its kernel [1]. Unfortunately, this approach does hurt the extensibility and 
usability of a commodity operating system, and its effectiveness is also questionable 
[2] [3]. The first objective of this research is to develop a new intrusion prevention 
approach to defend against kernel malware in virtual execution environments, which 
is complementary to previous intrusion prevention approaches. Concretely, one 
security software system based on virtual machine monitor (VMM) and hardware 
emulator is designed and implemented to collaboratively carry out the prevention task 
toward any suspicious kernel modules. Fine-grained intrusion prevention is achieved 
by enforcing a set of access control policies at the OS and hardware object level. In 
the end, this research demonstrates it is possible to create an effective and high-
performance intrusion prevention system for kernel malware in commodity operating 
systems.  
Recently, it has been found that hackers have started applying anti-reverse-
engineering techniques to rootkits, e.g., packing kernel code, which impedes the static 




virtualized execution environments has drawn people’s attention. Unfortunately, 
previous dynamic analysis systems are limited in the sense that they focus on the 
discovery of specific behaviors of kernel malware such as hooking activities [4] [5] 
and triggering events [6]. The second objective of this research is to build a novel 
malware analysis system based on hardware emulator that can automatically capture 
the extensive behaviors of kernel malware, including the kernel functions and data 
structures that malware call and visit. We expect this system will be able to help 
people quickly and accurately identify the security-sensitive activities of kernel 
malware in the future.     
The dissertation is organized as below: chapter 2 provides the background 
information on kernel malware and virtualization security. Additionally, an overview 
of related research work is presented. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 respectively present the 
details of kernel intrusion prevention system DARK and kernel malware analysis 
system Rkprofiler, including designs, implementations and evaluations. Finally, 

















2.1 Kernel Malware 
 Kernel malware refers to kernel rootkits in this thesis. A rootkit is a program 
designed to take fundamental control of a computer system, without authorization by 
the system’s owners and legitimate managers [7]. Running as a root user 
(administrator in Windows), a rootkit can arbitrarily access and modify any system 
resource on a victim machine. This “almighty power” makes the defense against 
rootkits become one of the most technical challenges to the security community in 
recent years. 
A rootkit that is installed in user space is referred as user-land rootkit. One typical 
technique employed by user-land rootkit is to tamper with system libraries like 
glibc.so and ntdll.dll to hide processes or files. Contrarily, a rootkit that is installed in  
the kernel is called kernel rootkit. The kernel rootkits are more difficult to address 
than user-land rootkits, as the former locates at a lower software layer and can do 
more damages. This research is concentrated on studying the defense mechanisms 
against kernel rootkits. For ease of the presentation, the term rootkit is used to 
substitute the term kernel rootkit in the rest of this dissertation.  
The first known rootkit was written for SunOS in 1994 and it was intended to take 
control of an unresponsive system as a fault handling utility. However, when Internet 
came to many peoples lives, it became the carrier of all kinds of malware. Soon, these 
malware writers found that rootkits could help gain access to systems while avoiding 
detection; rootkit techniques took off then. Rootkits draw public attention in 2005, 




altered the Windows OS to allow access to anyone who is aware of the rootkit 
installation. The discovery of this corporate-sponsored malware made many users 
previously unfamiliar with rootkits wary.  
Today, hackers make use of rootkits to achieve multiple attacking goals. At least 
five goals are observed in practice: user-space object hiding (HID), reconnaissance 
(REC), reentry/backdoor (REE), defense neutralization (NEU), and privilege 
escalation (PE). HID rootkits conceal hackers’ presence on a compromised system by 
hiding files, processes, drivers, network connections, registry entries and others. 
Administrators can’t run regular system software to recognize these hidden objects. 
The intention of REC rootkits is all about monitoring what people do on a victim 
computer. Rootkits can sniff packets, intercept keystrokes, or read e-mails. The 
typical targets of these rootkits are credit card numbers, bank accounts, passwords and 
email contacts. REE rootkits allow hackers to turn a victim computer into a zombie 
computer (normally become one node of a botnet) and use it as a staging ground for 
further abuse such as denial-of-service attack, relaying chat sessions and email spam 
distribution. NEU rootkits directly attack security software and bypass their defense. 
The techniques used by NEU rootkits include disabling the security services, 
modifying the kernel firewall hooks and abusing signature libraries. Last, PE rootkits 
alter kernel data structures to allow a non-privileged user to have root privilege and 
carry out tasks that are reserved for super users. As a note, a rootkit could carry 
multiple attacking goals. For example, FUTo [8] is referred to as both HID rootkit and 
PE rootkit.     
This research also adopts Joanna Rutkowska’s rootkit categorization [9] in the 
interest of pursing a standardized classification. Her model describes three types of 




never be modified (code segments, MSRs, BIOS, etc); Type II includes malware that 
modifies things that should be modified (global variables, some hooks and other data). 
Most rootkits being used for real-world attacks belong to type I and II rootkits. Type 
III rootkits just target special hardware features. For example, Blue pill [10] takes 
advantage of hardware virtualization extensions (Intel’s VT [11] and AMD’s Pacifica 
[12]) to hide itself.  
2.2 Virtual Machine and Security 
A virtual machine (VM) is a software implementation of a machine that executes 
programs like a real machine. Depending on the computing layers that virtual 
machines imitate, they are separated into three categories: application virtual machine, 
OS virtual machine and hardware virtual machine. An application virtual machine is a 
software layer between operating system and a process (application), and it provides a 
platform-independent programming environment that abstract underlying software 
and hardware resources. Java virtual machine (JVM) and Common language runtime 
(CLR) of .NET framework are two such examples. An OS virtual machine is a 
system-level compartment (or zone) that has its own files, processes, user and root 
accounts. The typical examples are Free BSD jails [13] and OpenVZ [14]. A 
hardware virtual machine allows the sharing of the underlying physical machine 
resources between different virtual machines and each VM runs its own operating 
system (namely guest OS). The software layer providing virtualization is called a 
virtual machine monitor (VMM) or hypervisor, which can run on either bare hardware 
or host operating system. VMware [15] and Xen [16] are two popular VMMs. 
Because application virtual machines and OS virtual machines are not effective in 




Gerald J. Popek and Robert P. Goldberg [78] proposed a set of sufficient conditions 
for computer architecture to efficiently support system virtualization, which is known 
as Popek and Goldberg virtualization requirements. In short, a genuine virtual 
machine should possess three properties: 
1. Equivalence: a program running under the VMM should exhibit a behavior 
essentially identical to that demonstrated when running on an equivalent 
machine directly. 
2. Resource control: the VMM must be in complete control of the virtualized 
resources. 
3. Efficientcy: a statistically dominant fraction of machine instructions must 
be executed without VMM intervention.  
Popek and Goldberg further introduced a classification of instructions in an 
Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) into two groups: privileged instructions and 
sensitive instructions. They pointed out that, for any computer, a VMM can be 
constructed if the set of sensitive instructions for that computer is subset of the set of 
privileged instructions. IBM System/370 and Motorola MC68020 are two examples 
of natively virtualizable architectures that meet the Popek and Goldberg virtualization 
requirements. Unfortunately, John Scott Robin and Cynthia E. Irvine [79] shown that 
X86 architecture violates the Popek and Goldberg virtualization requirements: IA-32 
instruction set contains 17 sensitive and unprivileged instructions.  
To overcome this limitation, people developed two approaches to implement VMM 
on X86 CPUs: paravirtualization and direct execution combined with fast binary 
translation. With paravirtualization, the VMM builder defines the virtual machine 
interface by replacing nonvirtualizable portions of the original instruction set with 




ported to run in a virtual machine. For example, Xen [16] (until version 2.0) used to 
paravirtualization to make virtual machines gain high performance. The second 
approach runs application programs (in the unprivileged mode) of a VM directly on 
the CPU and the VMM has a binary translator that controls the kernel code (in the 
privileged mode) of the VM. The translator translates the privileged code into a 
similar block, replacing the problematic instructions, which lets the translated block 
run directly on the CPU. The translation blocks are placed in a trace cache so that 
translation does not occur on subsequent executions. VMware workstation adopted 
this approach. On the other hand, CPU vendors also added new hardware features to 
the X86 architecture to support virtualization. Both Intel and AMD added a new 
execution mode to the processor that lets a VMM safely and transparently use direct 
execution for running virtual machines, which is called hardware-assisted 
virtualization. In addition, the recent releases of Intel and AMD’s CPUs also have 
virtualization supports for memory and IO management, and they improve the virtual 
machine’s performance significantly [80].       
Virtualization emerged as a technique for managing mainframes in the 1960s. 
Virtual machine technology was rapidly gaining acceptance as a fundamental building 
block in enterprise data centers since the late 1990s. Today, not only are the servers in 
data center virtualized, but also are corporate desktops being virtualized. We have 
seen an explosion in growth in development, deployment and implementation of 
various VM-related products. The main drives that make VM popular are reduced 
hardware cost, ease of management and simplified maintenance. Although security 
benefits offered by VM are not a major factor affecting the commercial world in the 




Virtualization holds unique properties that make it attractive for building novel 
system security mechanisms, including isolation, inspection, interposition and replay. 
Isolation indicates that software running in a VM cannot access or modify the 
software running in the VMM or in a separate VM. Even if an intruder has completely 
subverted a VM, he still cannot tamper with security software outside the VM. 
Inspection means that the VMM has access to all the states of a VM: CPU states (e.g. 
registers), memory, and IO device states. This property makes it difficult for malware 
in a VM to evade VMM-supported security software, since there is no state in the 
monitored guest host that the VMM-supported security software cannot see. 
Interposition refers to the capability that the VMM interposes on certain virtual 
machine operations such as software interrupts and execution of privileged 
instructions. Intercepting certain VM events can be the key building block in a VMM-
based security system. Replay is a property that the VMM snapshots a VM, logs 
nondeterministic VM inputs (like keystrokes) and replays the long-term execution of 
the VM instructions. This enables VMM to provide arbitrarily detailed observations 
on what transpired on the compromised VM, even in the presence of non-
deterministic attacks and executions.  
A number of VMM-based security systems that took advantage of these security-
friendly properties have been successfully designed and developed in last six years. 
For examples, Livewire [18] and VMwatcher [19] are two VMM-based host intrusion 
detection systems (HIDS) that pull the security software outside of the monitored 
VM. These systems not only gain greater attack resistance from operating outside the 
VM, but also benefit from the ability to inspect and interpose the guest OS inside the 
VM at a hardware level. Terra [20] and Overshadow [21] are another two VMM-




trust operating systems and applications. ReVirt [22] and Aftersight [23] apply the 
reply technique of virtual machines to creating fine-grained intrusion analysis 
systems.  
Because operating systems operate at the highest level privilege (also called “ring 
0”) in physical machines, kernel malware makes security software on these machines 
stuck with a difficult chicken-and-egg problem. Once the kernel has been 
compromised, the detection tools themselves are left unprotected. Thus, the arms race 
between attackers and defenders rapidly devolves into a complex game of war. One 
instance is Microsoft PatchGuard [24] and the arms race to disable it is already in full 
swing [25]. Being named “ring -1”, the emergence of VMM changes the rule of this 
game: defenders (detection tools in VMMs) have higher system privilege than 
attackers (kernel malware in VMs) and therefore gain the prior advantage in the game. 
Unsurprisingly, the studies on VMM-based rootkit defense mechanisms [18] [19] [26] 
[27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [38] bloom in accordance.  
2.3 Hardware Emulation 
Hardware emulation is a process that one software program (emulator) duplicates 
the functions of one computer architecture (CPU and IO devices), so that a virtual 
machine running over the emulator behaves like (and appears to be) the equivalent 
running over the real machine. While running on a host CPU architecture, a hardware 
emulator can simultaneously provide multiple CPU architectures to its VMs. So, you 
can run Windows Mobile on an ARM CPU, being supported by an emulator that is 
executed within Red Hat Linux on an X86 CPU. In comparison, a VMM requires that 
the CPU architecture of a VM is same as the host CPU architecture. Because emulator 




direct execution is not allowed, emulation imposes higher performance overhead than 
virtualization. Boch [81] and Qemu [82] are two popular open source hardware 
emulators. The latter has been extensively used in this research.  
 The core component of Qemu is the dynamic translator [46]. It performs a runtime 
conversion of the target CPU instructions to the host instructions. The resulting binary 
code is stored in a code cache so that it can be reused. The dynamic translator 
interprets the target code using decode-dispatch approach [83]. Qemu uses a 
simulated Program Counter (PC) of the VM to guide the iteration of a main loop, in 
which every bytecode instruction from the VM is processed in three phases: opcode 
decode, dispatch and execute. The decode phase fetches the part of an instruction 
(opcode) that represents the instruction type. The dispatch phase uses this information 
to invoke appropriate handling routines. The execute phase, which is performed by 
the dispatched handling routine, performs additional fetches of operands and executes 
the semantics of the instruction. In the dispatch phase, Qemu splits one instruction of 
the VM into fewer simper instructions called micro operations. Each micro operation 
is implemented by a small piece of C code (handling routine). In an iteration of the 
main loop, Qemu fetches instructions of the VM up to the next jump or the one that 
modifies the static CPU state in a way that cannot be deduced at translation time. 
These instructions that are handled in a loop are composed of a Translated Block 
(TB). Each TB is indexed by the physical memory address of the first instruction of 
this TB. A 16 M byte code cache holds the most recently used TBs. It is completely 
flushed when it is full. At the beginning of a loop, Qemu uses the simulated PC to 
search the code cache and determines if the target TB has been translated. If yes, the 
host binary code of this TB is directly executed, then the dispatch phase is skipped. 




techniques are employed in Qemu to improve its overall performance, e.g., condition 
code optimizations and direct block chaining. Besides the dynamic translator, the 
other two components of Qemu are emulated devices (mouse, VGA display and so 
on) and generic devices. They provide the emulated IO devices to VMs.           
2.4 Related Work 
Rootkit Detection 
Integrity Verification [18] [32] [33] [34] is one popular rootkit detection approach 
that follows the spirit of Tripware [35] in protecting the file systems. It builds a 
baseline database for the measurable objects (e.g., text, static data) of the target guest 
OS by either storing the original data or computing the hashes. The detector 
periodically acquires the measurable objects from the current state of the guest OS 
and compares them with the baseline database to decide whether an intrusion occurs. 
Because it is hard to create baselines for dynamic data objects, this method can 
capture type I rootkits but not all type II rootkits.    
Semantic Integrity Verification [26] extends the idea of integrity verification and 
creates a series of language-based specifications to describe the abstract models for 
low-level security-relevant data structure and the relationship between them. The 
detection is conducted through checking if kernel’s state meets these specifications. 
This method can detect some type II rootkits, but it fails in the situation where the 
first logic predicate does not exist or is almost impossible to infer under an attack, 
e.g., contaminating the entropy pool of the Linux kernel [36]. Further, its specification 
generation depends on an expert’s knowledge, so the overall effectiveness of this 




Cross-view diff-based method [37] detects hidden objects (files, processes) by 
comparing a “low level” view with a “high level” view. One example is to use “ls 
/root” to show the file list under root directory from the user shell and run an agent to 
directly read the disk sectors containing “/root” to get another file list. If two file lists 
differs, then the different files are hidden. The agent, who obtains “low level” view in 
a detector, faces a dilemma: if it’s not close to hardware, then the rootkits can 
intercept the reading operations and pollute its “low level” view; if it’s close to 
hardware, e.g. accessing hard driver with “IN” and “OUT” instructions, the 
implementation complexity is increased as various HDD controllers need to be taken 
care of. On the other hand, rootkits can evade the detectors through temporarily 
disabling hidden behavior during their detection. Last, this method can only identify 
the rootkits aiming to hide system objects, but can not handle the rootkits with other 
attack vectors such as bypassing security software 
Enforcing control flow integrity is s new rootkit detection approach proposed by 
[27]. The key idea of this approach is to intercept or inspect the kernel’s dynamic 
branches (mainly function pointers) to ensure no illegal modification occurs. In [27], a 
type graph is constructed from parsing Linux kernel source, and the memory locations 
of function pointers are calculated from the global variables and type graphs. This 
approach is effective to thwart the rootkits that alter the kernel’s control flow, but is 
not guaranteed to cover all the dynamic branches in the kernel, and also fails to deal 
with the rootkits that tamper with data other than function pointers.  
Inference and Enforcement of Kernel Data Structure Invariants is used by system 
Gibraltar [31] to automatically detect rootkits that modify both control and non-
control kernel data. The key technique is to externally observe the execution of the 




Specifically, a graph of all kernel objects in the memory is created and the values of 
those objects’ members are recorded at the training period, the dynamic invariant 
detector Daikon [76] is then applied to derive constraints on the objects’ data. These 
constraints (invariants) are used as specification of data structure integrity during an 
enforcement phase: violation of these invariants indicates the presences of a rootkit. 
Because Gibraltar uses Myprinet PCI intelligent network card to fetch physical 
memory pages via the DMA communication, a rootkit who is aware of it can evade 
the memory acquisition by modifying system registers [77]. Moreover, Glbraltar 
doesn’t address the ambiguous data types such as generic pointer, dynamic array and 
unions, it could miss significant portion of kernel objects [72].    
Robust signatures for kernel data structures [71] is an automated mechanism that 
generate robust signatures for kernel data structures. Any attempt to evade the 
signature by modifying the structure contents will cause the OS to consider the object 
invalid. This mechanism doesn’t need to create a baseline database for the rootkit 
detection. Instead, it is similar to cross-view diff-based method: running user-space 
program (like task manager) to get the user view of system objects (like processes) 
and then acquiring the kernel view of the system objects through searching the kernel 
memory and matching the signatures. Then, the comparison of two views can reveal 
the hidden objects. The signature of a kernel object is generated in three stages: 1. The 
target data structure is profiled to determine which fields are most commonly 
accessed by the operating system; 2. The most frequently accessed fields are fuzzed to 
determine which can be modified without causing a crash or otherwise preventing the 
structure from serving its intended purpose; 3. The dynamic invariant detector Daikon 
[76] is used to build a signature based on known-good instances of the data structure 




This method is suitable to complex kernel data structures like EPROCESS. 
Unfortunately, many simple and small size kernel data structures may not have such 
robust signatures at all. In addition, the method also suffers the coverage problems in 
the profiling and fuzzing stages, which possibly leads to false positives.     
        
Rootkit Prevention 
  Microsoft bolsters the driver signing technology and one of its purposes is to 
counter rootkit attacks. 64-bit Vista and Windows 2008 server require that only 
drivers signed by a trusted authority can be loaded to their kernels. Unfortunately, this 
rootkit prevention approach is weak. First, the current signing process is not designed 
to confirm the “intent” of signed code (i.e. good or bad), so malicious code is able to 
get a valid signature as well. And they, in turn, can disable Vista’s code signing 
controls or bypass it through directly loading other code to the kernel [2]. Second, this 
approach is not plausible to most third-party driver developers as they have no easy 
way to debug their code on target systems, and development cycles become more 
complex, as each new version of the driver needs to be signed. Third, this approach 
can not deal with the thousands of legacy Windows drivers. Last, the bugs in the 
signed drivers can still be exploited by a hacker to take control of the kernel with 
rootkits [2] [3]. Because Microsoft hasn’t applies this policy to 32-bit platforms, 
which own the majority of Windows users, the overall effectiveness of this approach 
is not proven so far, and time will tell the truth in the future.  
NICKLE [28] and SecVisor [38] are two run-time intrusion prevention systems that 
leverage hardware virtualization extensions to prevent unauthorized kernel code from 
execution. Similar to the driver signing approach, both systems assume an 




they do provide tighter security assurance than driver signing approach, because the 
latter cannot block zero-day kernel-code exploitations. Concretely, NICKLE employs 
a new scheme called memory shadowing, wherein the trusted VMM maintains a 
shadow physical memory for a running VM and performs real-time kernel code 
authentication so that only authenticated kernel code can be stored in the shadow 
memory. In addition, NICKLE transparently routes guest kernel instruction fetches to 
the shadow memory at runtime, which guarantees only the authenticated kernel code 
can be executed by VM. The downsides of NICKLE include the increased physical 
memory footprints of a VM and inability of supporting self-modified kernel code. 
SecVisor modifies the AMD’s SVM to guard the page table of a guest OS, and 
enforces the W+X policy over the memory pages of guest OS, meaning that a page is 
either writable or executable, but never both. SecVisor achieves the same security 
guarantees as NICKLE at the cost of the requirement that the source of guest OS 
(Linux) need be modified.   
HookSafe [73] is a hypervisor-based lightweight system that can protect thousands 
of kernel hooks in a guest OS from being hijacked. HookSafe achieves its 
functionality in two steps. First, an offline hook profiler component profiles the guest 
kernel execution and outputs a hook access profile for each protected hook. A hook 
access profile includes those kernel instructions that read from or write to a hook and 
the set of values assigned to it. Then, an online hook protector component takes hook 
access profiles as input and creates a shadow copy of all protected hooks and 
instruments hook access points instructions such that their accesses will be 
transparently redirected to the shadow copy. As such, these kernel hooks are relocated 
to a dedicated memory space and accesses to them are regulated with hardware-based 




are constructed based on dynamic analysis and thus may be incomplete. Further, 
HookSafe assumes the prior knowledge of the set of kernel hooks that should be 
protected, so some of kernel hooks are not included in their prototype.  Last, 
HookSafe also impose non-negligible overhead (about 6%) to system performance.   
 
Rootkit Analysis 
  Kruegel [39] and Limbo [40] use program analysis techniques to examine the 
innocence of a suspicious module. In particular, Kruegel performs program analysis 
with symbolic execution, a technique that simulates a program execution with 
symbols, e.g., replacing a variable’s value with its name. Behavior specifications are 
created based on symbols to enforce the detection. This approach can be evaded by 
those rootkits that don’t use the illegal symbols directly in the binaries: brute-force 
guessing a target memory address. In addition, it doesn’t inspect the multiple 
execution path of a module and possibly misses some attacks. Limbo loads a 
suspicious module into an emulator and uses flood emulation to explore multiple 
running paths of a module. Behavior specifications of Limbo are automatically 
generated by applying data mining to a large number of malware samples. To increase 
the coverage of the examination, flood emulation doesn’t keep the data states on 
paths, even including those deciding branches, so a module might behave abnormally 
in the emulator, resulting in inaccurate detection.  
HookFinder [4] and HookMap [5] aim to identify the hooking behavior of rootkits. 
HookFinder performs dynamic taint analysis and allows users to observe if one of the 
impacts (tainted data) is used to redirect the system execution into the malicious code. 
On the other hand, HookMap is intended to identify all potential hooks on the kernel-




employed to identify all memory locations that can be altered to diverted kernel 
control flow. Unfortunately, hooking is only one aspect of rootkit behavior and both 
systems cannot provide comprehensive views of rootkit activities in a compromised 
system. 
K-tracer [6] is a rootkit analysis system that automatically discovers the kernel data 
manipulation behaviors of rootkits including sensitive data access, modification and 
triggers. K-tracer performs data slicing and chopping on sensitive data in the rootkit 
trace and identifies the data manipulation behaviors. K-tracer cannot detect hooking 
behaviors of rootkits and is unable to deal with DKOM and hardware-based rootkits. 
An ideal rootkit analysis system should be able to handle a broad range of rootkits, 
including DKOM and hardware-based rootkits, and provide a complete picture of 
rootkit activities in a compromised system.  
PoKeR [41] is another rootkit analysis system that shares the same design goal as 
this research: comprehensively revealing rootkit behavior. PoKeR is capable of 
producing rootkit traces in four aspects: hooking behavior, target kernel objects, user-
level impact and injected code. Similar to Rkprofier, PoKeR infers the dynamic kernel 
object starting from the static kernel objects. However, PoKeR only tracks the 
pointer-based object propagation, while ignoring the function-based object 
propagation. This limits PlKeR’s capability of identifying kernel objects. 
Furthermore, the function call and hardware access monitoring features are not 
offered by PoKeR.  
KOP [72] is a kernel analysis system that can map dynamic kernel data with nearly 
complete coverage and nearly perfect accuracy. It maps all the dynamic kernel objects 
by performing a complete traversal of the memory, starting from a set of globally 




have been covered. KOP addresses three ambiguous data types: generic pointer, union 
and dynamic array. Concretely, KOP applies inter-procedural points-to analysis to 
compute all possible types for generic pointers; a pattern matching algorithms is 
chosen to resolve the type ambiguities of unions; it recognizes dynamic arrays by 
leveraging knowledge of kernel memory pool boundaries. The output of KOP is an 
object graph that contains all the identified kernel objects and their pointers to other 
objects. Although KOP doesn’t directly profile or detect kernel malware, it provides 
the solid foundation (kernel data maps) for other systems to fulfill these 
functionalities. Hackers can disrupt KOP’s traversal by polluting the kernel memory. 
For instance, they may intentionally break the internal structure of key kernel objects 
by tampering with the values stored at pointer fields. As a result, the KOP’s traversal 
might incorrectly identify these objects due to pointer field mismatches. Another 
shortage of KOP is that it may not be able to detect non-global transient kernel objects 
that only live within a function. 
      
Binary Translation 
  Several recent projects have borrowed techniques from dynamic optimization to 
rewrite programs on the fly; such techniques allow for fine control of program 
execution. Valgrind [42] is a powerful framework for dynamic rewriting of Linux/x86 
programs, which can be adapted to security application development. Valgrind’s 
rewriting uses a simplified intermediate language, sacrificing performance for ease of 
development. Strata [43] is a more security-oriented tool that achieves lower 
overheads (about 30%) while enforcing targeted security policies such as system call 
interception. Kiriansky’s program shepherding [44] is build based on the dynamoRIO 




programs’ control flow, as an efficient and transparent means to prevent stack and 
function-pointer-smashing vulnerabilities from being exploited. All these binary 
translation systems impose a high performance penalty and can’t be directly used as 
an inline prevent system. In addition, they need to run in the same OS space as 
malware, and cannot resist malware’s attacks.   
  
Demand Emulation 
  Ho [45] first proposed the concept of Demand Emulation that can be used to solve 
the security problems. His system modifies the emulator’s hardware support to enable 
data tainting at the system level. The system is built on Qemu and Xen VMM, and its 
main application is to detect and prevent malicious code injection by tracking data 
received from the network as it propagates through the VM. In the system, the 
incoming network data are tainted and traced during their lifespan, which requires 
relatively heavy emulation. Moreover, as Xen and Qemu each have their own fault 
and interrupt handlers, the Ho’s system requires a fault or interrupt issued in 
emulation mode must first be trapped and processed by Xen’s handler and then passed 

















KERNEL INTRUSION PREVENTION 
 
  In this chapter, we present a kernel intrusion prevention system that tracks LKM-
based rootkits at a granite level by using on-demand emulation, a technique that dynamically 
switches a running system between virtualized and emulated execution. The basic idea is to 
sandbox a suspicious loadable kernel module in an emulator and to assure its 
goodness by enforcing a group of well-selected security policies. Based on open 
source software Qemu and Kqemu [82], we designed and implemented a software 
system, named DARK that uses on-demand emulation to provide a powerful defense 
against kernel malware. In DARK, when a rootkit tampers with a kernel object or 
hardware object, its illegal behavior is captured and blocked. In the meanwhile, VM 
emulation takes place only at time that a suspicious module is executed, and the most 
operations of the VM are performed in the virtualization mode. Thus, the substantial 
execution overhead caused by emulation is avoided. Our contribution in this work 
includes: 
1. Identification of non-integrity-violation rootkits that can escape kernel 
integrity verifiers. 
2. Implementation of a novel rootkit prevention system based on on-demand 
emulation to sandbox a suspicious kernel module.  
3. Creation of a group of security policies to detect and block all rootkits we 






Kernel run-time protection mechanisms can be categorized as prevention and 
detection. Previous run-time rootkit prevention approaches [28] [38] focus on 
protecting the benign kernel code and thwarting malicious kernel code. One key issue 
here is how to determine the goodness and trustworthiness of a piece of kernel code. 
Unfortunately, previous approaches failed to give in-depth analysis of this problem 
and just simply assume it is a priori knowledge to end users or protection systems, 
which is not true in practice. To the date, there is no such commodity operating 
system that strictly controls the kernel code loading based on both goodness and 
trustworthiness of kernel code. Even Microsoft’s driver code signing [1] is just 
employed for the identification of driver authors, but not for assuring the goodness of 
signed drivers [2].  Even though, the effectiveness and robustness of this mechanism 
are still a question mark [2] [3].  In the end, people have to make decision on 
whether to install a useful but potentially unsecure driver, which is a challenge that is 
not addressed by previous approaches.   
Run-time Rootkit Detection Methods proposed by researchers can be divided into 
two categories: specific rootkit detection and generic rootkit detection. Methods in the 
first category focus on capturing a specific type of rootkit. For example, Cross-view 
diff-based method [37] just targets those rootkits that conceal disk objects (files and 
registries); Lycosid [29] is intended to discover hidden processes only. On the 
contrary, methods in the second category are designed to counter broad types of 
rootkits. To best of our knowledge, the most generic rootkit detectors known to the 




verifiers concentrate on examining the states of some kernel objects to ensure that 
illegal tampering of these objects don’t occur. They are effective to defeat integrity-
violation rootkits. Unfortunately, theses kernel integrity verifiers suffer two 
fundamental weaknesses: incompleteness of assuring the integrity of dynamic kernel 
objects; incompetence at detecting non-integrity-violation rootkits, like 
confidentiality-violation rootkits and hardware-exploiting rootkits. These two 
weaknesses are discussed in detail as below. 
Dynamic Kernel Objects 
Most kernel rootkits are implemented in the form of kernel modules (drivers). 
Hence, they share the same virtual memory environments as operating system. No 
matter whether a kernel object (structure, list, text and so on) is exported or not by the 
OS, a rootkit can always directly access and tamper with it after being loaded to the 
kernel. In fact, direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) is one prevalent technique 
employed by rootkit writers [47].  A kernel object could reside on either permanent 
memory area (text, dss) or transient memory area (stack and heap); its content could 
be constant or changeable. A kernel object is static if its memory address is 
permanent. Otherwise, this object is dynamic. Defending a static kernel object is 
straightforward, as its location and content is relatively easy to identify. On the other 
hand, protecting a dynamic object could become challenging due to the following four 
reasons. First, in comparison with static objects, the population of dynamic objects is 
much larger, and enumerating all dynamic kernel objects at any time could be 
impractical. Second, since integrity verifiers have to wake up to work periodically, 
they miss catching lots of short-lived dynamic objects, e.g., local variables in stacks.  
Third, a detector’s recognition of dynamic objects can be attacked by rootkits so that 




table to hide kernel objects from detectors, or remove an element from a link list to 
make it untraceable. Last, the content of a kernel object can be unpredictable and 
detectors are unable to differentiated good and bad values. One such example is the 
entropy pool of the Linux, which can be manipulated by rootkits to compromise 
Linux Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) [36]. In summary, kernel integrity 
verifiers cannot assure the integrities of all dynamic objects in a kernel.  
 
Fig. 1. Keystroke data flow in Linux desktop 
Non-integrity-violation Rootkits 
Non-integrity-violation rootkits refers to those that launch attacks while not 
manipulating any kernel objects, so kernel integrity verifiers can’t catch them. One 
type of non-integrity-violation rootkits are hardware-exploiting rootkits [10] [48] [49] 
[50] [51], which misuse a hardware feature or configuration to achieve their goals. 
Another type of non-integrity-violation rootkits: confidentiality-violation rootkits. 
They only break the kernel data confidentiality while preserving the data integrity. 




e.g., keylogger and network sniffer. Next, we demonstrate one confidentiality-
violation rootkit: a Linux keylogger (called darklogger) that can sniff the keystroke 
without illegally changing any kernel object.    
Today, common Linux desktop environments like Gnome and KDE use the X 
window system to manage terminal services: interacting with keyboard and mouse, 
drawing and moving windows on the screen. The key data flow in a typical X window 
system is shown in figure 1.  On the X server, the key reading path from keyboard to 
user space consists of at least two threads working in tandem: a top thread originating 
from a user process that issues read requests, and a bottom thread originating from the 
interrupt service routine that reads the key data from the keyboard. Two kernel 
buffers, tty flip buffer (tty_struct.flip.char_buf) and tty read buffer 
(tty_struct.read_buf), store the key data (interpreted by keyboard driver) and provide 
the synchronization between the top thread and the bottom thread. When the top 
thread asks for data and the tty flip buffer is empty, the thread goes to sleep; when the 
bottom thread fills new key data to the tty flip buffer, it awakes the top thread who 
copies the new data from the tty flip buffer to tty read buffer and then to user space. In 
figure 1, when a key is generated by keyboard and travels to the shell, it may be kept 
in four kernel buffers. By adding hooks or patching code, traditional keyloggers 
hijack the control flow of kernel’s processing key data. Darklogger takes a passive 
approach based on the observation that tty read buffer is a large-size circular buffer 
and a char data, representing a key, in the buffer is not wiped off until the head 
pointer of the buffer moves back to its location, where a new char data is written. 
Since human’s keystroke speed is relatively slow (less than 30 characters/second) and 
the size of tty read buffer is large (4k), it takes more than 2 minutes to fill up the 




tty read buffer and acquire all key data. Based on the positions of the head and tail 
pointers in the buffer, Darklogger is able to extract the key data of the last period. 
Because Darklogger just uses the legal kernel APIs and doesn’t maliciously hook any 
function or modify any kernel data object, it can evade all kernel integrity verifiers.  
Following the spirit of sandboxing program [44], DARK captures the interactions 
between a rootkit and the rest of a kernel. The kernel objects visited (memory read, 
write and function call) by a rootkit are recorded and analyzed regardless of their 
locations, lifespan and contents. To DARK, the rootkit defense is an access control 
problem and its success depends on the effectiveness of the security policies.    
 
Fig. 2. An on-demand emulation system 
 
3.2 On-demand Emulation 
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) and emulator are two types of hypervisors that 
support and manage multiple virtual machines (VM). A VMM seeks to achieve high 
performance by directly executing most instructions of a VM on the host (physical) 




so as to provide different types of virtual CPUs to its VMs, paying the cost of poor 
performance. Due to their deep inspection capabilities, some researchers use 
emulators to perform various security related tasks, e.g. malware identification and 
analysis [40]. 
DARK is a hybrid system that combines the strengths of VMM and emulator to 
offer better system security and performance. It contains three components: a VMM, 
an emulator and a VM where a guest OS is installed. In virtualization mode, the 
virtual machine runs on top of the VMM to gain nearly native speed. When a 
suspicious module is to be executed in the VM, the VMM is informed to take control 
of the VM. Then, the VMM collects the virtual CPU state and status data of memory 
management unit (MMU), and sends them to the emulator. Thus, DARK is switched 
to emulation mode. Once receiving the VMM’s virtual CPU state, the emulator 
restores the VM’s operation and start monitoring the module’s activities and 
enforcing the security policies accordingly. When the execution of module code is 
completed, the emulator suspends the VM and passes its control back to VMM with 
the current virtual CPU state and MMU status data. The VMM restores the VM and 
DARK is switched virtualization mode. The emulation is required only when the 
target module is executed, and most of VM codes still run on VMM.  
3.2.1 Design 
The primary task of the on-demand emulation is to trap the module execution in a 
VM. However, a module may have many non-privilege instructions and their 
executions in a VM cannot trigger exception or interrupt, which is only way of 
transferring the control from VM to VMM in a virtual machine system. DARK 




present bit in the page table entry indicates whether a virtual page has been assigned a 
physical page frame. When a CPU accesses a virtual page whose present bit is 0, the 
memory management unit (MMU) generates a page fault. Then, an interrupt routine is 
invoked to allocate a physical page frame and copy the page data from the swap area 
or disk file (demand paging) to this physical page frame. As Linux never swaps kernel 
codes to disk, the present bits of kernel code pages are always set to 1. DARK can 
trap a module by clearing the present bits of its code pages in the virtualization mode. 
Later, when the module is to be executed, VM issues a page fault. Thus, the VMM of 
DARK intercepts the exception and passes the control to emulator, who sets those 
present bits back to 1 and starts executing and monitoring the module in the emulation 
mode. To maintain the integrity of the existing page fault mechanisms, the page fault 








  Before loading a module to the guest OS, the DARK user decides whether to 
monitor the module or not. If yes, the emulator is notified of the module name. To 
change the present bits of the module before its execution, the guest OS issues a 
software interrupt through instruction “int 0x90”. The VMM catches the interrupt, 
and hands it over to the emulator. Then, the emulator fetches the module name from 
the VM image and compares it with the one defined by DARK user to decide if the 
current module is right target. If two names are different, DARK gives up monitoring 
and switches back to virtualization. Otherwise, DARK kicks off the monitoring with 
the following steps. First, the emulator queries the text (code) range of the target 
module from the module list of the guest OS, and sends it to the VMM. Then, it clears 
the module present bits and transfers the control to VMM, forcing the system into the 
virtualization mode.  Later, when the module is to be executed, the VM generates a 
page fault, which is trapped to the VMM. The VMM uses the text range of the module 
to identify that the faulty instruction comes from the target module, and transfers the 
VM control to emulator. After setting the module present bits to 1, emulator restores 
the VM sessions and starts the monitoring process again. In this way, DARK moves 
the VM control between VMM and emulator back and forth depending on if the VM 
executes module code. Figure 3 depicts this on-demand emulation process. When the 
module is unloaded, DARK turns off on-demand emulation by cleaning up their 
monitoring records and set the corresponding present bits in the VM to 1. 
3.2.2 Implementation 
DARK is built on Qemu and Kqemu, who run on any X86 CPU regardless of the 
hardware virtualization support.  Both guest OS and host OS are Redhat Linux. As 
described in Chapter 2, Qemu is a hardware emulator that uses binary translation to 




kernel module that works with Qemu to provide virtual machine monitor functions. In 
the full virtualization mode of a Qemu/Kqemu system, all user-mode instructions and 
some kernel-mode instructions of a VM can be directly executed on the host CPU. 
For security reasons, the kernel-mode instructions for memory accesses in the VM 
have to be intercepted and interpreted by Kqemu. This is done by clearing the global 
descriptor table (GDT) and local descriptor table (LDT) when the VM runs in kernel 
mode. Thus, any kernel-mode memory access in the VM will cause a general 
protection fault. Kqemu captures these faults and interprets the instructions in the 
kernel. Because Kqemu needs Qemu to handle some corner cases such as interpreting 
a HLT instruction, some components of the on-demand emulation framework are 
already available in orginal Qemu and Kqemu software. To enable module tracking, 
DARK modifies the switch control code of the existing on-demand emulation 
framework. In particular, DARK adds the following business logics to the interrupt 
handler and V-to-E (virtualization to emulation) control code (in common/module.c 
and common/kernel.c) of Kqemu:  
1. If an interrupt vector number is 0x90 or 0x91, does emulation switch. 
2. For a page fault, if the faulty instruction address is within the text range of 
target module, does emulation switch.  
Moreover, we add one boolean variable to Qemu’s E-to-V (emulation to 
virtualization) control code to ensure that virtualization switch is disabled when the 
current instruction is from the target module and vice versa.        
  In addition, we instrument the guest OS kernel (Linux version 2.4.18): adding two 
assembly instructions to sys_init_module and sys_delete_module functions in 
kernel/module.c. The first instruction issues a software interrupt 0x90 before loading 
a module; the second one issues the interrupt 0x91after unloading a module. DARK 




Further, we modify the Linux module loader (insmod.c) to put the module text range 
in the runsize and kernel_data fields of the module descriptor, which allows DARK to 
read the text range later. In Linux, all processes share one kernel page table that can 
be accessed from the kernel master page global directory swapper_pg_dir. We use 
this global variable to locate the page table entries of the target module and rewrite 
the module present bits as described in Section 3.1. Last, we alter the page fault 
handler of the guest OS such that it ignores the page faults caused by the target 
module execution.   
3.3 Security Policy 
DARK does not aim to build perfect security policies to catch all rootkits. In fact, 
modern operating systems are not designed to be traceable and verifiable, so the 
creation of such “perfect” policies may be impossible. Rather, similar to SELinux 
[30], DARK provides a policy framework that gives security administrators the 
flexibility to write their own security policies. To demonstrate the effectiveness of 
DARK, we compose a group of security policies that are good enough to detect most 
existing Linux rootkits and raise the bar for future kernel exploits.  
3.3.1   Policy Framework 
DARK treats the rootkit detection as an access control problem: a malicious module 
needs to illegally access another part of kernel to perform the attack. DARK’s security 
policy is composed of a group of access control rules whose format is given in table 1. 

















  In table1, subject is a module that is to be monitored. A module’s home space 
contains: object (code and global data) section, stack and heap. Any instruction issued 
from a module space is regarded as a representative of this module, and should be 
monitored. Note DARK can apply various policies to different modules, which is 
discussed later. Operation indicates the way that a module interacts with the rest of 
kernel. DARK tracks three types of operations performed by a module: read, write 
and call. First two are memory access operations; call is an act that a module invokes 
functions exported by OS and other modules. Although a module may influence the 
kernel objects in other means, e.g. return of an external call, creating a system 
exception, these three operations are sufficient for DARK to detect the rootkits we 
know.   
  Object refers to those system resources and services accessed by a module. Two 
types of system objects are included in DARK: hardware objects and kernel objects. 
The former contains dedicated registers, IO ports and IO mapped memory. Many of 
these hardware objects are crucial to system security. For example, the register IDTR 
holds the linear address of interrupt descriptor table which is used by CPU to transfer 
an interrupt to the corresponding Interrupt handler. Hijacking this register allows 
hacker to amount various attacks, e.g. installing a virtual-machine-monitor-based 
rootkits [10] [51]. Kernel object is a software concept, and one kernel object is a 
group of kernel data or code that is semantically meaningful to software developer, 
like a structure, an integer variable and a function. Several kernel objects, e.g., system 
call table, are common attack targets to Linux rootkits. 
  In DARK, a policy rule that contains a hardware object is called system rule; a rule 




one representation in DARK, and it may be a register name, or IO port number or 
memory address. One kernel object has two representations: one is a software-level 
representation such as variable names and function names, which is used by DARK 
users to make policies; the other is a hardware-level representation and it is the 
memory address of the corresponding software object. Since DARK enforces policy 
at the hardware level, for a kernel rule, it’s necessary to translate its software-level 
representation to the hardware-level representation, which is called policy translation.  
  DARK’s kernel rules may contain both static kernel objects and dynamic kernel 
objects. A static kernel object’s memory address is determined when the kernel is 
build, so this object’s location is fixed all the time, e.g., system call table. Conversely, 
a dynamic kernel object’s location can only be decided at run time, e.g., a process’ 
page table. A kernel rule containing a static object is called static kernel rule; a kernel 
rule containing a dynamic object is called dynamic kernel rule. Unlike static kernel 
rules whose policy translation can be performed before a VM is powered on, policy 
translation of the dynamic kernel rules has to be postponed to run time. 
  DARK takes two actions on a policy violation: reject and alarm. Reject denotes 
that DARK immediately stops executing the target module and prevents any further 
damages. In Linux, removing a module is more complex and risky than deleting a 
process from the system, and the former can corrupt the OS’s operation integrity and 
reliability. Current implementation of reject action terminates the VM, and writes a 
warning message to a log file on the host OS. Granular failure remediation is of the 
future work. DARK’s alarm action only requires generating the logging messages 
instead of turning off the whole system. Determination of a reject or alarm action for 
a rule is based on the consideration of multiple factors: severities to system security, 




also greatly degrade the system reliability and satiability, reject should be the choice, 
e.g., runtime patching of the kernel text; For other attacks, terminating the current 
system operation is not necessary, and alarming is probably sufficient to enable 
defense measures such as sniffing network traffic.  
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3.3.2   Established Rule 
DARK’s policies are constructed based on common knowledge of the OS security 
and observation of attack patterns of the existing rootkits. Total 19 kernel rules are 
created and shown in table 2. Among them, four read rules and one call rule are used 
to address the data theft rootkits as discussed in 2.2. The rest fourteen write rules deal 
with kernel integrity. Eleven dynamic rules employ seven global variables as the 
starting points of policy translation. Among them, six global variables are 
single/double linked lists and the other one (proc_root) is associated with binary tree 
data structure. Note these global variables should be write-protection as well. 
Otherwise, rootkits may modify the variables to hinder the policy translation. We find 
that early-stage rootkits tend to manipulate the static kernel objects such as system 
call table and kernel text. These objects are critical to the system reliability and 
stability, any illegal modification of them should be rejected at once. Kernel objects 
contained in Rule 5 and 17 are such examples. On the other hand, some kernel rules 
are devised to counter the threats in the future, while not being hit by any existing 
Linux rootkit. For example, it’s reported that some Windows rootkits tamper with the 
kernel memory management system to hide some kernel objects. It can be foreseen 
that hackers may apply the same technique to Linux rootkits down to the road. Rule 6 
and 10 are designed to achieve such purpose. Rule 9 and 16 in table 3 are optional, 
because many normal networking drivers may violate them and enforcing these rules 
possibly generates false alarms. The usages of optional rules depend on user’s 
knowledge to the target modules. Beside kernel rules, we create 11 system rules, and 
most of them are applied to special system instructions that handle critical system-
level functions, e.g., SGDT and WRMSR. 
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Table 3. DARK’s system rules 
ID Name Operation Hardware Object Action Instructions 
1 BIOS Write BIOS ROM Reject MOV 
2 System Cache Write L1, L2 Cache Alarm INVD, WBINVD 
3 Control Register Write CR0, CR3, CR4 Reject MOV CRn 
4 Debug Register Write DR0-DR7 Alarm MOV DBn 
5 IO Port Read/Write IO Ports Alarm IN, OUT 
6 IDT Register Write idt register Reject LIDT 
7 GDT Register Write GDT Register Reject LGDT 
8 MSR Write MSR Alarm WRMSR 
9 System RAM Write System RAM Alarm MOVE 
10 TLB Write TLB Alarm INVLPG 
11 TR Register Write TR Register Reject LTR 
 
     
3.4 Enforcement 
DARK stores the security rules to a local file called policy.dat. This file contains the 
system rules, static kernel rules and software-level dynamic rules. When a VM is 
started, DARK forks a thread that performs three tasks: 1. loading the policy.dat to the 
RAM; 2. periodically translating dynamic kernel rules to the hardware-level 
representation; 3. transforming all memory-access rules to the hash-table based rules 
as discussed in Section 5.1. This thread stores all the rules to several global variables, 
which are used to enforce the policy at run time.  
When a suspicious module is to be executed, the emulator takes control of the VM 
and begins policy enforcement. Concretely, DARK intercepts all memory access 
instructions and some system instructions at the binary translation of Qemu. Note an 
alternative method is to change the Qemu’s simulated MMU to capture the memory 
accesses. However, this method cannot enjoy the benefit of code caching and suffers a 
larger performance penalty. For each of the monitored instructions, DARK checks the 
corresponding rules. If an instruction hits a rule, DARK takes the action defined in the 
rule. For alarm, DARK writes one warning message to the system log on the host 
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machine. The message includes the module name, the instruction’s address and the 
rule id. For reject, DARK generates an alarm and then powers off the VM by 
terminating the current Qemu process.  
3.4.1 Hash Table 
The data structures that hold memory access rules should be selected prudentially, 
as an inappropriate data structure might hurt system performance.  DARK’s memory 
access rules are initially defined as a series of memory intervals. One memory 
interval, like (0xC03254fa, 0xC03256a0), is called one memory bucket. Some 
dynamic rules, like socket buffer descriptors, comprise a large amount of memory 
buckets. If they are stored in link lists, DARK needs to traverse thousands of memory 
buckets (with various sizes) to inspect one instruction in a linear time of n. We present 
a data transformation method that converts a link list of memory buckets to two hash 
tables. Since hash table lookups takes O(1), it can significantly reduce the 
enforcement overhead.  
 
Fig. 4. Source code of the memory bucket transformation routine 
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Similar to the OS concept of 32-bit page frames, DARK uses 10-bit and 5-bit page 
frames in the transformation. The memory interval of a bucket is broken into multiple 
10-bit or 5-bit page frames and each page frame has one entry in a hash table. Two 
hash tables store 10-bit and 5-bit page frame rules respectively. Figure 3 lists the C 
implementation of the converting routine. The selection of 10 and 5 bit page frames is 
based on the observation that most memory buckets created by DARK are either large 
(at the page level) or small (less than 200 bytes). This division ensures that each hash 
table is not overwhelmed due to hash conflicts. Given a target memory address, 
DARK first computes its 5-bit page frame address by removing last 5 bit of the 
memory address, and searches for the frame address on the 5-bit hash table; if not 
found, it then does the same check for the 10-bit hash. Thus, only two bit operations 
and two hash table lookups are needed, at most.  
3.4.2 Code Cache 
To reduce the emulation overhead, DARK takes advantage of the performance 
optimization in Qemu. The key technique is to cache the translated code sequences so 
that they can be directly executed in the future. Each sequence of instructions ending 
with a single control transfer instruction is called a block. Qemu translates a block in 
each main control loop and places the translated block to a code cache. All the 
translated blocks are organized as a hash table and a cached block can be found fast. 
A block can be linked to another one if it doesn't contain the indirect branches, 
avoiding the extra loop cost.  DARK only performs the security check at binary 
translation, so once a block of code is put into the cache, DARK doesn't examine it 
any more. Finally, when the code cache is full, Qemu simply purges all blocks in the 
cache and refills the cache with new blocks. Since DARK’s emulator only caches 
small-size module code, the chance of overflowing the cache is small. 
 38  
3.4.2 Security Log 
DARK provides the logging capability that keeps record of the interactions between 
a module and the rest of the kernel. The log includes: memory write and read, 
function call and IO operations. For memory read and write, DARK prints out the 
instruction address, and target memory address and content. For function invocation, 
DARK records the function address, calling instruction address, the first two 
parameters and return value of the function. However, parameter semantics of a 
function are unknown, so DARK logs the first 16 bytes in the stack parameter area of 
the function. Note that DARK only logs the external memory accesses and function 
invocation. In addition, we create a tool that interprets log records, identifies all heaps 
that are assigned to the module, and removes them from the log. Combining this 
logging capability with Qemu’s snapshot can provide an abundant data source for 
forensic analysis.   
3.5 Evaluation 
This section presents the empirical results of the DARK system. The evaluation is 
composed of two subsections. In the first subsection, the functional effectiveness of 
DARK is investigated: whether the security policies are made properly in terms of 
false positive and false negative detection rates. Then, we conduct the performance 
evaluation and study the performance impact of on-demand emulation on the VM. 
DARK is built based on the QEUM 0.8.2 and KQEMU 1.3.0prell. All the experiments 
are performed on a Dell machine with Intel P4 CPU (2.8 GHz) and 1 GB RAM. The 
host OS is Fedora Core 5.0 and the guest VM was assigned 256M RAM and 6G hard 
drive; Guest OS is Red Hat Linux 8.0 with 2.4.18-14 kernel. 
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Adore X X    I 17 18 Reject 
Adore-ng X X   X II 7, 12, 13 18 Alarm 
Adore-ng 
(hidden) 
X X   X II 7*, 12, 
13 
18 Alarm 
Darklogger    X  II  15 Alarm 
Exception  X   X I 2 18 Reject 
Fileh-lkm X     I 17  Reject 
Hookstub  X    I 4 18 Reject 
Hp X X    II 18  Alarm 
KIS X  X   I 17  Reject 
Knark X X X   I 17 18 Reject 
Linspy2    X  I 16  Reject 
Nfsniffer    X  II 9 16 Alarm 
Nushu     X II  16 Alarm 
Pizzaicmp   X   II 9 16 Alarm 
Prrf X X    II 11, 12, 
13 
18 Alarm 
Sebek    X  I 7, 17  Reject 
Srootkit X     I 5  Reject 
Vlogger    X  I 17 14 Reject 
Vlogger (local)    X  II  1 Alarm 
3.5.1 Security 
In this experiment, we collect 18 rootkits that cover a wide range of attacks. Among 
them, there are 10 type I rootkits, 8 type II rootkits, 8 HID rootkits, 7 PE rootkits, 3 
REE rootkits, 5 REC rootkits and 3 NEU rootkits. In addition, one rootkit from [52] is 
devised to attack the hardware resources (system BIOS). Unfortunately, the Qemu’s 
BIOS is not updatable, so the rootkit cannot be successfully installed to the test VM. 
The other 17 rootkits are listed in table 4. A rootkit may have several operation modes 
and different modes may use different attack tactics. For example, with the technique 
described in [16], Adore-ng can optionally hide itself into a benign module, forming a 
“combo” module. We test the regular Adore-ng and hidden Adore-ng separately.  
To comprehensively understand rootkit behaviors, we run several Linux utilities 
like ls, ps, netstat and ssh to verify whether a rootkit works as expected after its 
installation. Moreover, when a rootkit violates a reject rule, we intentionally instruct 
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DARK not to shutdown the guest VM and make the rootkit continue to run until all 
testing utilities are finished. Thus, we can catch all security rules that the rootkit hits.   
The test result in table 4 suggests that DARK is able to detect all the rootkits with 
the security rules in table 4. Some rootkits violate multiple rules at loading stage and 
operation stage. System call table (rule 17) and task list (rule 18) are primary kernel 
objects that rootkits target on. Several type I rootkits hijack system call table to hide 
user-space objects or steal private data. IDT table and kernel exception table are 
another two static kernel objects that the rootkits tamper with in the test. To type II 
HID rootkits, proc file system provides exploitable kernel objects that are alternatives 
to system call table: two such rootkits (adore-ng and prrf) alter the relevant data 
objects of the proc system to hide processes and network connections. All the PE 
rootkits modify the user id and group id in the task_struct objects to raise a process’ 
privilege level. Another observation is all rootkits are captured at the loading stage 
except the Darklogger and Nushu. As we pointed out before, Darklogger is a non-
integrity-violation rootkit and does not illegally change any kernel object in the 
kernel. It just creates a kernel thread and initializes some data structures at the loading 
stage. Yet, its reading the PTS buffer is caught by DARK at the operation stage. 
Nushu manipulates the packets from/to local network adapters by indirectly 
registering hooks to the kernel through the function dev_add_pack. Because this 
function is not defined in table 3, Nushu escapes the loading-stage inspection. But 
DARK detects the intrusion when it reads socket buffers at the operation stage. Note 
that powerful kernel integrity verifiers are still likely to catch the Nushu due to its 
hooking behavior. 
In the experiment, Adore-ng is embedded in the module iptables_filter to create a 
combo module. By comparing the hidden Adore-ng with the regular Adore-ng, we 
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find that they hit the same set of rules. However, the combo module can not be 
unloaded from the kernel even after we flush the iptable rules and stop the iptable 
service. After further investigation, we found the reason. Both hidden Adore-ng and 
the regular Adore-ng modify the kernel module list, which is a list of module objects. 
The regular Adore-ng changes the next fields of the previous and next module objects 
with the purpose of hiding itself, while the combo module alters the uc.usecount field 
of the current module object to persist its existence in the kernel. Vlogger is also 
tested in two operation modes. Although the regular mode offers more powerful 
features than local mode, the latter turns out to be stealthier: it only alters the dynamic 
kernel objects and is a type II rootkit.  
Table 5. DARK’s false positive test 









cdrom Cdrom Pass 




Sound soundcore Pass 
crypto cryptoapi Pass 
 
To estimate the false positive rate of the detection system, we choose 7 categories 
and total 12 drivers from the Linux source, and execute them in the DARK system. 
When we test the network drivers, we inactivate the optional rules 9 and 16 to avoid 
the false alarms. The test result indicates that 11 of 12 drivers pass the test. The failed 
module is jdb and it is a journaling block device driver used by Ext3 file system for 
data recovery. This driver alters the journal_info filed of two process’ task_struct 
objects, leading to the violation of rule 18. This false alarm implies that the rule 18 is 
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too restrictive and should be revised to only include the sensitive fields that task list 
members. But, on the other side, this violation doesn’t incur the system termination 
and we believe that overall quality of the security rules is good. 
3.5.2 Performance 
Performance evaluation is intended to measure the impact of on-demand emulation 
on overall system performance. The module iptable_filter from Linux source is 
chosen to be monitored. First, this module operates at the kernel network stack, which 
is one of major attacking targets to rootkits. Second, running this module in emulation 
mode is expected to only degrade the performance of the network subsystem in the 
kernel, and other subsystems should not be affected. Iptable_filter registers three 
hooks to netfilter and applies the iptable rules to network traffics at three guarding 
points of the netfilter: input, output and forward. We write a number of input and 
output iptable rules and neither of them actually blocks the network traffics during the 
test. Three benchmarks: bonnie [53], iperf [54] and lmbench [55], are performed to 
examine the performance of disk IO, network IO and the entire system respectively.  
Comparing with VMM-only system (pure virtualization system), DARK’s overhead 
comes from on-demand emulation, which is composed of two parts: 1. Context switch 
between virtualization and emulation; 2. Execution overhead in emulator, including 
binary translation, policy enforcement and execution of translated code sequences. To 
identify the contribution of each part to the overall cost, we devise another test 
system: DARK-CS. It does the context switch from virtualization to emulation when 
an iptable_filter function starts to run. Then, emulator returns the control back to 
VMM immediately and the iptable_filter function is actually executed over VMM. 
Therefore, context switch between virtualization and emulation is the only overhead 
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of DARK-CS. In the experiment, we run each benchmark in DARK, DARK-CS and 
VMM-only system. 
Table 6. bonnie test result for 100 M files 
 
Sequential Output Sequential Input Random 
Per Char Block Rewrite Per Char Block Seeks 
K/sec %CPU K/sec %CPU K/sec %CPU K/sec %CPU K/sec %CPU /sec %CPU 
VMM 8528±233 64.6±3 12755±1425 45.1±5 19082±1490 53.0±3 15805±2301 75.4±4 129292 71.3±2 3515±1908 84.7±4 
DARK-
CS 
8038±345 61.5±5 11715±1379 41.2±6 17402±1834 48.2±2 16860±2004 80.3±5 130266 74.3±4 4969±1759 85.4±2 
DARK 8168±405 67±6 13949±1106 43.7±5 18742±2046 49.8±2 14480±2720 73.4±7 125493 72.7±4 5117±1254 83.2±4 
 
Table 6 shows the test result of bonnie. It’s observed that three systems have little 
performance difference when running bonnie. This is because bonnie just accesses the 
files on disk and iptable_filter is not being executed. Bonnie’s test result suggests that 
DARK’s overall performance is same as VMM-only system when on-demand 
emulation doesn’t take place.  
Table 7. iperf test result for 30 seconds traffic  
 VM as Server (M/sec) VM as Client (M/sec) 
 TCP UDP TCP UDP 
VMM-only 21.8±1.2 1.05±0.1 26.8±2.3 1.13±0 
DARK-CS 19.73±0.5 1.01±0 23.99±1.4 1.08±0.1 
DARK 19.60±0.6 1.00±0.1 24.05±1.0 1.08±0.1 
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The iperf test result in table 7 reveals the impact of on-demand emulation on overall 
system performance. TCP and UDP throughputs of DARK-CS are slightly (about 
10%) lower than VMM-only’s, which indicates that the overhead of context switch is 
non-negligible but not significant.  CPU state transferring, shadow page table 
synchronization and page fault handling are three main components of context switch 
in DARK. However, It is still unknown which component should take the 
responsibility of performance penalty at the moment. Further, it seems that neither 
component has   much room left for performance improvement. Table 5 also 
suggests that DARK and DARK-CS have indistinguishable TCP and UDP 
throughputs. This result can be explained by the code caching technique introduced in 
section 5.2: to a block of module code, binary translation and policy enforcement are 
performed only at the first time this block of code is executed, and its translated code 
sequence in the code cache plays the primary role of deciding the performance in the 
long run.  So code caching is effective to reduce the emulation overhead. We also 
did the performance test with the Imbench, and test result (Appendix A) confirmed 
the conclusions we draw above.  
3.6 Discussion 
To make DARK more applicable, it’s desired to develop new approaches to further 
reduce the DARK’s overhead. On strategy is to combine static analysis and dynamic 
analysis techniques to gain better understanding of a LKM’s behavior. For example, 
one method could be not monitoring a callback function repeatedly for the same set of 
parameters if we can assure that they always lead to the same execution path. This can 
be done by examining the function’s control flow graph (CFG) and data flow graph 
(DFG) that are constructed through static analysis. Another strategy is to tweak the 
tradeoff between performance and security: sacrificing a bit level of security to gain 
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better performance. One method for DARK could be to selectively switch to 
emulation based on certain conditions, e.g., current system load, virtual CPU usage 
and bandwidth usage. Apparently, this method achieves better performance at the cost 
of degrading the security level. 
DARK’s current policy database was manually built based on expert’s knowledge, 
which could be challenged by those malware that explores vulnerabilities unknown to 
policy creators. So, it’s necessary to seek approaches that automate the policy 
generation and increase the coverage of the policy base. One previous work that 
DARK can refer to is [40]. It uses the data mining technique to extract the rules that 
differentiate benign and malicious modules.  
It should be pointed out that DARK is not designed to withstand the rookits that 
access to kernel in abnormal ways, e.g., directly writing kernel memory or injecting 
malicious code to kernel by exploiting the vulnerabilities of benign kernel code. 
These attacks have been well addressed by previous rootkit prevention systems [28] 
[38].  
Last, DARK built its detector in the hypervisor layer in order to evade the attacks 
by malware in a guest OS. It largely depends on the assumption that hypervisor 
(emulator or VMM ) is isolated from guest OS. In reality, this assumption may not be 
true because of the vulnerabilities in hypervisor software. Recent work [56] has found 
some vulnerabilities in the main hypervisor software that can be explored to penetrate 
the hypervisor layer. This problem outreaches the scope of DARK, and other security 
mechanisms have to be relied on to address it. 
 
 
 46  
CHAPTER 4 
 
KERNEL MALWARE ANALYSIS 
 
In the chapter, we present a proof-of-concept system, Rkprofiler, in attempt to 
provide comprehensive profile of kernel malware. Rkprofiler is built based on the PC 
emulator QEMU and analyzes Windows rootkits. The binary translation of QEMU 
allows Rkprofiler to sandbox rootkits and inspect each executed malicious instruction. 
Further, Rkprofiler develops the memory tagging technique to perform just-in-time 
symbol resolving for memory addresses visited by rootkits. Combining deep 
inspection with the memory tagging, Rkprofiler is able to track all function calls and 
most kernel object accesses made by rootkits.  
4.1 Motivation 
When an attacker breaks into a machine and acquires administrator privileges, 
kernel malware could be installed to serve various attacking purposes (e.g., process 
hiding, keystroke logging). The complexity of attackers' activity on machines has 
significantly increased. Rootkits now cooperate with other malware to accomplish 
complicated tasks. For example, the rootkit Rustock.B has an encrypted spam 
component attached to its code image in memory. The initialization routine of this 
rootkit registers a notification routine to the Windows kernel by calling the kernel 
function PsCreateProcessNotifyRoutine. This notification routine is then invoked 
each time that a new process is created. When detecting the creation of Windows 
system process Service.exe, Rustock.B decrypts the spam components and injects two 
threads into the Service.exe process to execute the spam components [57]. Without 
understanding the behavior of the Rustock.B rootkit, it would be difficult to determine 
how the spam threads are injected into the Service.exe process. To fully comprehend 
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malicious activities on a compromised machine, it is necessary to catch and dissect 
key malware that attackers have loaded onto the machine. Thus, analyzing rootkits is 
an inevitable task for security professionals. 
Most of the early rootkits were rudimentary in nature and tended to be single-
mission, small and did not employ anti-reverse engineering techniques (e.g., 
obfuscation). These rootkits could be manually analyzed using disassemblers and 
debuggers. Since rootkit technology is much more mature today, the situation has 
changed. Rootkits have more capabilities and their code has become larger and more 
complex. In addition, attackers apply anti-reverse engineering techniques to rootkits 
in order to prevent people from determining their behavior. Rustock.C is one such 
example. The security company, Dr. Web, who claimed to be one of the pioneers that 
provided defense against Rustock.C, took several weeks to unpack and analyze the 
rootkit [58]. The botnet using Rustock.C was the third largest spam distributor at that 
time, sending about 30 million spam messages each day. This example illustrates how 
the cost incurred by the delay of analyzing kernel malware can be huge. As another 
example, the conficker worm that has infected millions of machines connected to the 
Internet was reported by several Internet sources [59] [60] (on April 8th 2009) that a 
heavily encrypted rootkit, probably a keylogger, was downloaded to the victim 
machines. At the time of the writing of this dissertation, which was three days later, 
no one had published the details of the rootkit. It is still unclear how severe the 
damage (e.g., economic, physical) will be as a result of this un-dissected rootkit. 
Accordingly, developing new approaches for quickly analyzing rootkits is urgent and 
also critical to defeating most rootkit-involved attacks.   
Several approaches have been proposed to address the rootkits analysis problem to 
some extent. For examples, HookFinder [4] and HookMap [5] are two rootkit hooking 
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detection systems. The former uses dynamic data tainting to detect the execution of 
hooked malicious code; and the latter applies backward data slicing to locate all 
potential memory addresses that can be exploited by rootkits to implant hooks. K-
tracer [6] is another rootkit analysis system that uses data slicing and chopping to 
explore the sensitive kernel data manipulation by rootkits. Unfortunately, these 
systems cannot meet the goal of comprehensively revealing rootkit behavior in a 
compromised system. Meeting this goal requires answering two fundamental 
questions: 1) what kernel functions have been called by rootkits? and 2) what kernel 
data objects have been visited by rootkits? Rkprofiler is such system that aims to 
provide the answers to these two questions.  
4.2 Challenges 
Modern operating systems (OSs) like Windows and Linux utilize two ring levels 
(ring 0 and 3) provided by X86 hardware to establish the security boundary between 
the OS and applications. Kernel instructions and application instructions run at ring 
level 0 and 3 respectively (also called kernel mode and user mode). The execution of 
special system instructions (INT, SYSENTER and SYSEXIT) allows the CPU to 
switch between kernel mode and user mode. This isolation mechanism guarantees that 
applications can only communicate with the kernel through well-defined interfaces 
(system calls) that are provided by the OS. Many sandbox-based program analysis 
systems take advantage of this isolation boundary and monitor the system calls made 
by malware [61] [62]. While this approach is effective to address user-space malware, 
it fails to address kernel malware. This is because there is no well-defined boundary 
between benign kernel code and malicious kernel code. Kernel malware possess the 
highest privileges and can directly read and write any kernel objects and system 
resource. Moreover, kernel malware may have no constant ``identity'' - that is, some 
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kernel malware could be drivers and others could be patches to benign kernel 
software. So the first challenge is how to create a ``virtual'' boundary between kernel 
malware and benign kernel software. Rkprofiler overcomes this challenge by using 
the timing characteristic of malware analysis. Before loading kernel malware, all 
kernel code is treated as benign code; after loading kernel malware, newly loaded 
kernel code is considered malicious. Note this ``virtual'' boundary only isolates code, 
but not data. This is because the data created by malicious code can also be accessed 
by benign code, and Rkprofiler does not monitor the operations of benign kernel code 
for the purpose of design simplicity and better performance.  
When monitoring a VM at the hypervisor layer, only hardware-level activities (e.g., 
memory reads and writes) are observed. To make these observations useful, it is 
necessary to translate the hardware-level activities to software-level activities. Here, 
software-level activities refer to using software terms to describe program activities. 
For example, local variable X is modified. This translation requirement is also known 
as the semantic gap problem [18]. This problem can be expressed as the following: 
given a memory address, what is its symbol? Automatically finding the symbols for 
static kernel objects (global variables and functions) is straightforward, but 
automatically finding the symbols for dynamic kernel objects (data on stack and heap) 
is challenging. This challenge is not well addressed by previous work. In this 
research, we propose a method called aggressive memory tagging (AMT) to 
overcome this challenge. The basic idea of AMT is to perform the symbol resolution 
at run time and derive the symbols of dynamic kernel objects from other kernel 
objects whose symbols have been identified.  It should be pointed out that Microsoft 
does not publish all kernel symbols and we can only gather the kernel symbols that 
are publically available (Microsoft symbol server, DDK documents and some 
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unofficial Internet sources). So the current implementation of Rkprofiler is not able to 
resolve many unpublished symbols. Nevertheless, we find that it identifies most 
sensitive available symbols in our evaluation.  
4.3 System Description 
Rkprofiler is composed of four software components: generator, controller, 
monitor and reporter. These software components operate in three phases temporally: 
pre-analysis, analysis and post-analysis. In the pre-analysis phase, the generator 
collects symbols of native Windows kernel modules (e.g., ntoskrnl.exe, ndis.sys) from 
the program database (PDB) files available on the Microsoft symbol server [63] and 
header files in Microsoft's Driver Development Kit (DDK). Two databases are 
produced by the generator at the end of this stage: type graph and system map. The 
type graph database contains the data type definitions of native Windows kernel 
modules. There are six classes of data types: basic type, enum, structure, function, 
union, and pointer. The data types in the last four classes are considered as composite 
data types, indicating that a data type includes at least one sub data type. For example, 
the sub data types of a structure are data types of its data members. In the type graph 
database, Rkprofiler assigns a unique type ID to each data type. A data type is 
represented by its type ID, type name, size, class ID and class specific data (e.g., the 
number of sub data types and their type IDs). The system map database keeps the 
names, relative virtual addresses and type IDs of global variables and functions used 
by native Windows kernel modules. In addition, the names and type ID of parameters 
and the return value for each function are also stored in system map. The generator is 
comprised of several executables and Perl scripts.  
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Fig. 5. Rkprofiler architecture and rootkit analysis process 
  Executing malware and monitoring its behavior are carried out in the analysis 
phase. Two components of Rkprofiler, controller and monitor, are involved in this 
phase. The monitor is built into QEMU. The controller is a standalone shell script that 
sends commands to the monitor via the Linux signal mechanism. Four commands are 
defined in their communication messages: RKP_INIT, RKP_RUN, RKP_STOP, and 
RKP_REPORT,, (which are explained shortly). First, a test VM is started and goes 
into a clean state in which no malware is installed and executed. Then, the controller 
sends a RKP_INIT command to the monitor. After receiving the command, the 
monitor queries the kernel memory image of the guest OS and creates a hash table of 
trusted kernel code. Next, the controller instructs the monitor to start monitoring 
through a RKP_START command. At that point, Rkprofiler is ready for the 
monitoring task. For example, a user starts executing malware in the VM. Depending 
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on the attack objectives of the malware, the user may run other applications to trigger 
more behaviors from the malware. For example, if the malware is intended to hide 
processes, the user may open the Windows task manager to induce the hiding 
behavior. Since the malware can be tested repeatedly, the attack objectives of the 
malware can be inferred from the analysis results of previous tests. To obtain the 
monitoring result or end the test, the user can have the controller issue RKP_REPORT 
or RKP_STOP commands to the monitor. The first command informs the monitor to 
write the monitoring result to local audit files; the second command prompts the 
monitor to stop monitoring and clear its internal data structures. Four audit files in 
CSV format are generated in the analysis phase: trace, tag trace, tag access trace, and 
system resource access trace. These files contain the functions called by the malware, 
their parameters and return values, kernel data objects visited by the malware and 
their values. In the post-analysis phase, the reporter is executed to create user-friendly 
reports. Using the audit files generated in the analysis phase, the reporter performs 
three tasks. First it builds a call graph from the call trace and saves the graph to 
another file; second, it visualizes the call graph and tag trace with open-source 
software GraphViz [64]; third it generates the HTML-formatted reports for call traces 
and tag traces (CSV format). The entire analysis process is illustrated in Figure 5. 
The monitor component of Rkprofiler was built based on the open-source PC 
emulator QEMU. To support multiple CPU architectures, QEMU defines an 
intermediate instruction set. When QEMU is running, each instruction of a VM is 
translated to the intermediate instructions. Rkprofiler performs code inspection and 
analysis at the code translation stage. To improve the performance, QEMU caches the 
translated Translation Block (TB) so that it can be re-executed on the host CPU over 
time. However, this optimization approach is not desirable to Rkprofiler because an 
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instruction can behave differently in varied machine states. For example, the 
instruction CALL, whose operand is a general-purpose register, may jump to diverse 
instructions depending on the value of that register.  For each malicious TB that has 
been cached, Rkprofiler forces QEMU to always perform the code translation. But, 
the newly generated code is not stored in the cache and the existing cached code is 
actually executed.  Another problem arises when a TB contains multiple instructions. 
In QEMU, VM states (register and memory contents) are not updated during the TB 
translation. Except for the first instruction, the translation of all other instructions in a 
TB could be accompanied by incorrect VM states, possibly resulting in analysis 
errors. Rkprofiler addresses this problem by making each malicious TB include only 
one instruction and disabling the direct block chaining for all malicious TBs. 
4.4 Malicious Code Detection 
Kernel malware could take the form of drivers and be legitimately loaded into the 
kernel. They can also be injected into the kernel by exploiting vulnerabilities of 
benign kernel software. Rkprofiler is designed to detect kernel malware that enter the 
kernel in both ways. Roughly speaking, before any malware is executed, Rkprofiler 
looks up the kernel memory image and identifies all benign kernel code in the VM. 
Then it groups them into a Trust Code Zone (TCZ) and a hash table is created to store 
the code addresses of the TCZ. When malware is started, any kernel code that does 
not belong to the TCZ is regarded as malicious and therefore is tracked by Rkprofiler. 
Identification of the trusted kernel code is straightforward if the non-execute (NX) 
bit of the page table is supported by the (virtual) Memory Management Unit (MMU) 
of a (virtual) processor. In this case, the kernel code and data do not co-exist in any 
page of memory. Rkprofiler just needs to traverse the page table of a process to find 
out all the executable kernel pages. QEMU can provide a NX-bit enabled virtual 
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processor (by enabling the PAE paging mechanism), but this system configuration is 
not common. Doing so may influence the malware behavior in an undesired manner. 
For example, the malware could stop running when it detects that the (virtual) CPU is 
NX enabled. So, the current implementation of Rkprofiler does not require enabling 
the NX-bit of the virtual CPU. Instead, it interprets all images of benign kernel 
modules and obtains the Relative Virtual Addresses (RVA) of the code sections. Then 
it computes their actual virtual addresses by adding the RVAs to the module base 
addresses, which is acquired by scanning the kernel memory of the VM. After that, 
Rkprofiler stores the TCZ addresses in a hash table. However, one common type of 
kernel malware attack is to patch the benign kernel code. To accommodate this type 
of attack, Rkprofiler excludes the patched code from the TCZ and revises the TCZ 
hash table at run time. Rkprofiler identifies the patched code by examining memory 
write operations and memory copy functions that the malware performs. Note, 
malware could escape this detection by indirectly modifying the TCZ code (e.g., 
tampering with kernel memory from user space). A more reliable method is to 
monitor the integrity of the TCZ as [33] does. Last, Rkprofiler determines whether a 
kernel TB is malicious or not right before it is translated. If the address of a TB is not 
within the TCZ, it is deemed as a malicious TB. The hash table implementation of the 
TCZ ensures that malicious code detection has a small performance hit on the entire 
system. 
4.5 Function Tracking 
Kernel malware often interacts with the rest of the kernel by calling functions 
exported by other kernel modules. In Rkprofiler, we use the terms I2E (Internal-to-
External) and E2I (External-to-Internal) to describe the function-level control flow 
transferring between malicious code and benign code. Here, internal and external 
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functions refer to the malicious function code and benign function code respectively. 
Function calls and returns are two types of events that Rkprofiler monitors. For 
example, I2E call indicates the event that an internal function invokes an external 
function; I2E return refers to the event that an internal function returns to its caller 
that is an external function. Capturing these function events is important for 
Rkprofiler to reveal the activity of the malware. Further, in an instance, the kernel 
malware may directly call the registry functions exported by ntoskrnl.exe like 
zwSetKeyValue to manipulate local registry entries. Rkprofiler is also designed to 
capture the I2I (Internal-to-Internal) call and return events. By doing so, Rkprofiler is 
able to construct (partial) call graphs of the kernel malware, which helps a security 
professional understand the code structure of the malware. This capability is 
important, especially when the malware is obfuscated to resist static code analysis. 
Note, E2E (External-to-External) function events are not monitored here because 
Rkprofiler does not inspect benign kernel code.   
To completely monitor the function-level activity of malware, a data structure 
called function descriptor is defined to represent a stack frame (activation record) of a 
kernel call stack, allowing Rkprofiler to track the call stacks of the kernel malware. 
When a function that is called by malware is detected, Rkprofiler creates a new 
function descriptor object and pushes it to the stack. Conversely, when the function is 
returned, its function descriptor object is popped from the stack and is deleted. One 
function descriptor has a pointer that points to the function descriptor of the caller. 
This pointer is used by Rkprofiler to construct the caller-callee relationships in the 
post-analysis phase.  
4.5.1 Function Call and Return Detection 
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The method of detecting a function call event depends on the calling directions. For 
I2I and I2E calls, Rkprofiler monitors the CALL instructions executed by the 
malware. Further, it can obtain the function address from the operand of a CALL 
instruction and the return address that is next to the CALL instruction. For E2I calls, a 
CALL instruction belongs to TCZ and is not monitored by Rkprofiler. So, the 
detection point is moved to the first instruction of the callee function. To capture E2I 
calls, Rkprofiler adds extra data members to the TB descriptor TranslationBlock. The 
first data member indicates what the last instruction of this TB is: CALL, JMP, RET 
or others. If it is a CALL instruction, the second data member records the return 
address of the call. Rkprofiler fills in the two data members of a TB when it is being 
translated. In addition, Rkprofiler creates a global pointer that points to the last TB 
descriptor whose code was just executed by the virtual CPU. Before translating a 
malicious TB, Rkprofiler queries the last TB descriptor to decide if it is an E2I call 
event. The decision is based on three criteria: 1) if the last TB is benign; 2) if the last 
instruction of the last TB is CALL; and 3) if the return address stored in the kernel 
stack is equal to the one stored in the last TB descriptor. The reason for criterion 3 is 
that the return address is always constant for both direct and indirect calls. On the 
other hand, Rkprofiler processes the function return events in a similar way to the call 
events: for I2I and E2I returns, Rkprofiler captures these events by directly 
monitoring the RET instructions executed by the malware; for I2E returns, Rkprofiler 
detects them at the instructions directly following the RET instructions and the criteria 
of the decision are similar to that for the E2I calls.   
Two problems complicate the call event detection methods described above. The 
first one is a pseudo function call, which is caused by JMP instructions. When a 
kernel module attempts to invoke one function exported by another kernel module, it 
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first executes the CALL instruction to invoke an internal stub function and the stub 
function then jumps to the external function by running the JMP instruction. 
Normally, the internal stub function is automatically generated by a compiler and the 
operand of the JMP function is an IAT entry of this module, whose value is 
determined and inserted by the system loader. Without recognition of these JMP 
instructions, Rkprofiler incorrectly treats an I2E call as an I2I call: labeling the new 
function descriptor with the internal stub function address. One example of such 
functions is DbgPrint. To address a pseudo function call, Rkprofiler first creates an 
I2I function descriptor and labels it with the internal stub function address. When 
detecting if an internal JMP instruction is executed in order to jump to an external 
address, Rkprofiler locates the I2I function descriptor from the top of the function 
tracking stack, and replaces the internal address with the external address. The second 
problem is an interrupt gap. This is where an interrupt is sent to the (virtual) CPU 
while it is executing an E2I CALL (or I2E RET) instruction. Consequently, some 
interrupt handling instructions are executed between the E2I CALL (or I2E RET) 
instruction and the subsequent internal instruction that Rkprofiler monitors. In this 
situation, the last TB descriptor does not record the expected CALL (or RET) 
instruction, so Rkprofiler is unable to track the E2I call (or I2E return) event and 
observes an unpaired return-call event. The solution to this problem is part of our 
future work. Fortunately, we did not see interrupt gaps in the experiments.  
4.5.2 System Context 
As an extension to the kernel software, a kernel malware could run in multiple 
system contexts. Under some circumstances, finding the running context of a malware 
can benefit the user’s understanding of its behavior. In an instance, when malware 
code runs in an interrupt context, it means that the malware probably has 
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compromised interrupt handling routines. The relevant interrupt request (IRQ) 
numbers can provide more information about the attacks, e.g., manipulating IRQ 1 
triggered by keyboard almost implies a key logger at once. In Rkprofiler, Qemu helps 
determining interrupt contexts. Specifically, whenever a CPU receives an interrupt, it 
need conduct a series of operations to preserve the current system context and start the 
relevant interrupt handling routine, e.g., pushing the EIP register to stack. When the 
interrupt routine returns, the IRET instruction is executed to restore the previous 
system context. Correspondingly, Qemu need simulate the CPU's handling of an 
interrupt at the two moments: CPU’s entering the interrupt context and CPU’s leaving 
the interrupt context. Rkprofiler places a global variable in the interrupt simulation 
code of Qemu, and it can indicate if a VM enters or leaves an interrupt context. For 
process contexts, Pkprofiler reads the relevant process information of the current 
process from its process descriptor object (EPROCESS) in the kernel, e.g., process id 
and image name. These data are stored in a data structure called context descriptor.  
Rkprofiler associates each monitored function with one context descriptor object, 
representing the actual running context of this process. Note only E2I calls require 
Rkproifler querys system context each time, and the context information of I2E and 
I2I calls can be inherited from of their callers.  
4.5.3 Parameter Tracing  
To track the parameters of an interest function, Rkprofiler first checks if this 
function is semantically identifiable: an external function in the system map or a 
tagged function whose type definition can be found in the type graph. Section 4.6 
discusses the details of how functions are tagged. Rkprofiler traces a function 
parameter with three attributes: type id, name and IO flag. The IO flag indicates 
whether this parameter is an input or output of the function. Name and IO indicator 
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may not be available for every function, so they are optional attributes. Here, the 
return value of a function is treated as one output parameters. When monitoring an 
interest function, Rkprofiler records the input parameters before it starts, and records 
the output parameters after it returns.  In default, one parameter is processed as an 
input parameter. 
To locate function parameters in a VM, it is necessary to understand the calling 
conventions of Windows operating system.  They influence the ways that parameters 
are passed to functions. Windows adopts three calling conventions: _cdecl, _stdcall 
and _fastcall. _cdecl is the default calling conventions for C and C++ functions. 
Under this convention, a caller can pass various numbers of parameters to its callee 
and it is responsible for cleaning the parameters in the stack after the callee returns. 
Most of Windows kernel C Run-Time (CRT) functions follow this calling convention. 
A _stdcall function has a constant number of parameters, which allows compiler to 
calculate total parameter size and make the callee function clean the stack. So _stdcall 
usually generates smaller code size than _cdecl. Most Windows kernel APIs use 
_stdcall. When calling a _cdecl or _stdcall function, CPU pushes the function 
parameters to stack in the reversing order (from right to left).  The _fastcall calling 
conversion puts the first two parameters to ECX and EDX registers and the rest 
parameters to stack in the reversing order. The return value of a function is always 
passed through the EAX register regardless of its calling convention. Rkprofiler finds 
the calling convention of a function (or function type) from the system map or type 
graph. 
       NTSTATUS  
        ZwOpenKey( 
           OUT PHANDLE        KeyHandle, 
            IN ACCESS_MASK      DesiredAccess, 
           IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes 
         ); 
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Besides calling conventions, Rkprofiler also need have the knowledge of parameter 
sizes and stack layout. Parameter sizes are stored in type graph, and stack layout is a 
prior knowledge as described in [65]. The following example illustrates how 
Rkprofiler tracks function parameters. The Windows kernel function ZwOpenKey can 
be called by malware to open an existing registry key. The declaration of this function 
is shown in graph XX.  ZwOpenKey has one output parameter and two input 
parameters. When a malware executes the CALL instruction to invoke this function, 
Rkprofiler captures the event and starts acquiring the parameters as below. Rkprofiler 
first queries the system map to obtain th ZwOpenKey e parameter lists and their type 
ids. Then, it realizes that two input parameters DesiredAccess and ObjectAttributes 
should be gathered at this moment. Because ZwOpenKey is a _stdcall function, all 
three parameters are stored in the stack. Rkprofiler also knows that parameters are 
pushed to the stack from the right to left, and the stack pointer (ESP) is pointing to the 
first parameter KeyHandle. Thus, Rkprofiler can figure out the addresses of 
DesiredAccess and ObjectAttributes and read their values.  After ZwOpenKey 
executes the RET instruction, Rkprofiler detects the event and starts reading two 
output parameters. Although the parameter KeyHandle is literally popped up and the 
ESP is pointing to the item below the parameters in the stack at this point, the 
parameter value is still stored in the stack. Rkprofiler can compute the address of 
KeyHandle and read its value. Finally, the return value, whose type is NTSTATUS, is 
obtained from the EAX register.  
4.6 Memory Tagging 
Rkprofiler observes the hardware-level activities of kernel malware, so they should 
be translated to software-level activities to be understandable to users.  Thus, given a 
virtual address that the malware visits, Rkprofiler is required to find its symbols (e.g., 
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variable name and type). Here, we name the process of finding symbols for kernel 
objects as memory tagging. A memory tag is composed of tag ID, virtual address, 
type ID, variable name (optional) and parent tag ID (optional). If a kernel object is 
owned by the malware, it is an internal kernel object; otherwise, it is an external 
kernel object. If a kernel object is located in the dynamic memory area (stack and 
heap), it is a dynamic kernel object; otherwise, it is a static kernel object. Rkprofiler 
tags four types of kernel objects: static internal, dynamic internal, static external and 
dynamic external. Static external kernel objects include global variables and Windows 
kernel functions. Their symbols are stored in a system map. Tagging a static kernel 
object is straightforward. Rkprofiler searches the system map by its virtual address 
and the hit entry contains the target symbols. However, tagging a dynamic kernel 
object is challenging because its memory is dynamically allocated at run time and the 
memory address cannot be predicted. Attackers often strip off the symbols of their 
malware in order to delay reverse engineering, so Rkprofiler assumes that malware 
samples do not contain valid symbols.  
Previous Linux rootkit detection systems [27] [31] present one approach of tracking 
dynamic kernel objects. A rootkit detector first generates a kernel type graph and 
identifies a group of global kernel variables. At run time, it periodically retrieves the 
dynamic objects from the global variables based on the graph type. For example, if a 
global variable is a linked list head, the detector traverses the list under the direction 
of the data structure type of list elements. Unfortunately, this approach cannot be 
applied to the task of profiling kernel malware. First, it covers a limited number of 
kernel objects, and many other kernel objects such as functions and local variables are 
not included. Second, since the creation and deletion of dynamic kernel objects could 
occur at any time, the time gap between every two searches in this approach will 
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produce inaccurate monitoring results. Last, this approach may track many kernel 
objects that the malware never visits. In this research work, we propose a new symbol 
exploration approach, Aggressive Memory Tagging (AMT), that can precisely find 
symbols for all kinds of static and dynamic kernel objects at a low computation cost.  
4.6.1 AMT Description 
We define a kernel object as contagious if another kernel object can be derived 
from it. Tag inferring is a process where a kernel object (child object) is derived from 
another (parent object). Two types of kernel objects are considered contagious: 
pointers and functions. A pointer kernel object could be a pointer variable or a 
structure variable containing a pointer member. The child object of a pointer is the 
pointee object. For a function, its child objects are the parameters and return value of 
this function. AMT follows the principle of the object tracking approach described 
above: tracing the dynamic objects from the static objects. Specifically, Rkprofiler 
first tags all static kernel objects that the malware accesses (memory reads/writes and 
function calls) by querying the system map. Then, the child objects of the existing 
contagious tags are tagged via tag inferring. This process is repeated until the malware 
stops execution or the user terminates monitoring. Note, a tag could become invalid in 
two scenarios: 1) if when a function returns, the tags of its local variables are 
invalidated; and 2) if a memory buffer is released, the associated tag becomes out of 
date as well. Only valid tags can generate valid child tags.   
Rkprofiler performs tag inferring through a pointer object at the time that the 
malware reads or writes the pointer object. The reason is as follows: when reading a 
pointer, the malware is likely to visit the pointee object through the pointer; when 
writing a pointer, the malware will possibly modify the pointer to point to another 
object if the new value is a valid memory address. Because the executions of benign 
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kernel code are not monitored by Rkprofiler, both read and write operations over a 
pointer have to be tracked here. If only read operations are monitored, Rkprofiler 
cannot identify the kernel objects whose pointers are written by malicious code and 
read by benign code. Many hooks implanted by rootkits fall into this scenario. 
Similarly, if only write operations are monitored, Rkprofiler can miss the 
reorganization of kernel objects whose pointers are written by benign code and read 
by malicious code. Many external kernel objects that are visited by rootkits fall into 
this scenario. The procedure of tag inferring through a pointer object is as follows: 1) 
Rkprofiler detects a memory read or write operation and searches the tag queue to 
check if the target memory corresponds to a contagious tag; 2) if yes, Rkprofiler 
obtains the up-to-date pointer value and verifies that it is a valid memory address; 3) 
Rkprofiler searches the tag queue to check if the pointee object is tagged; 4) if not, 
Rkprofiler obtains the symbols of the pointee object from the type graph and creates a 
new tag. On the other hand, when a recognizable function is called, tag inferring 
through the function object is carried out by identifying the function parameters.  
Input parameters are tagged when the function is called; output parameters are tagged 
when the function returns.   
4.6.2 Implementation 
Rkprofiler creates a data structure called tag descriptor to represent memory tags.  
A tag descriptor includes the virtual address of the tag, type ID, a boolean variable, a 
num variable for memory type, one pointer to the parent tag and one pointer to the 
function descriptor. The Boolean variable indicates if a tag is contagious or not. The 
memory type member tells if the tagged object is on the stack, heap or another 
memory object. Rkprofiler monitors the kernel memory management functions called 
by malware and records it to a heap list (the memory buffers allocated to the 
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malware). When a buffer is released, Rkprofiler removes it from the heap list. The 
function descriptor member of a tag helps identify which function is running when 
this tag is generated. Finally, Rkprofiler maintains a tag queue that contains all the 
tags that have been created. When a tag is created, its tag descriptor is inserted into 
the tag queue. The tag is removed from the tag queue after it becomes invalid.  
Because malware's memory accesses are frequent events, Rkprofiler needs to search 
the tag queue frequently as well. The tag queue describes a group of various-sized 
memory segments. If it is organized as a list structure like a linked list, its linear 
searching time is expensive. To address the problem, Rkprofiler applies the approach 
presented in Chapter 3 that converts a group of various-sized memory segments to a 
hash table. The basic idea is to break a memory segment into a number of fix-sized 
memory segments (buckets). A list structure is stored in one bucket to handle the case 
that some portions of the bucket should not be counted. In this way, the time for 
searching the tag queue becomes constant.    
The Windows kernel provides built-in supports for linked lists via two data 
structures: SINGLE_LIST_ENTRY (for single linked list) and LIST_ENTRY (for 
double linked list). Several kernel APIs are available to simplify driver developers' 
tasks when managing linked lists (e.g., adding or removing elements). However, this 
support causes problems to the memory tagging process of Rkprofiler. For example, 
in a double linked list, each element contains a data member whose data type is 
LIST_ENTRY. Two pointers of this data member point to the LIST_ENTRY data 
members of two neighbor elements. When one list element is tagged and malware 
tries to visit the next list element from this one, Rkprofiler just tags the LIST_ENTRY 
data member of the next list element with the type LIST_ENTRY. This is not 
acceptable because what Rkprofiler wants to tag is the next list element with its type. 
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In the pre-analysis stage, we annotated the SINGLE_LIST_ENTRY and 
LIST_ENTRY data members with the type names of list elements and their offsets. 
When parsing the type header file, the generator replaces the SINGLE_LIST_ENTRY 
and LIST_ENTRY data members with pointers to list elements. The offset values are 
also stored in the type graph, allowing the monitor to find the actual addresses of 
neighbor elements. Another problem is relative pointers. The Windows kernel 
sometimes uses relative pointers to traverse a list in the following way: the address of 
the next element is computed by adding the relative pointer and the address of the 
current element. One example is the data buffer that contains the disk file query result 
by kernel function NtQueryDirectoryFile. Because these relative pointers are defined 
as unsigned integer, we also need to label the relative pointers in the kernel type 
header file such that Rkprofiler can recognize them and properly compute the element 
addresses.  
Rkprofiler has to handle two ambiguous data types that the Windows kernel source 
uses. The first one is union. Union is a data type that contains only one of several 
alternative members at any given time, and the memory storage required for a union is 
decided by its largest data member. Unfortunately, guessing which data member of a 
union should be used at a given time depends on code context, which is hard to 
automate in Rkprofiler. The second one is generic pointer pvoid. Pvoid can be caste to 
another data type by developers. The actual data type that pvoid points to at a given 
time is context dependent too. Automatically predicting the pointee data type for 
pvoid is another challenge. The current default solution is to replace a union with one 
of its largest members and leave pvoid alone. While performing the analysis, a user 
can modify the kernel data type header file and change the definition of union or 
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pvoid in terms of his understanding of their running contexts. An automated solution 
has been proposed in [72]. 
4.7 Hardware Access Monitoring 
In comparison to user-space malware, kernel malware is able to bypass the 
mediation of the OS and directly access low-level hardware resources. In X86 
architectures, in addition to the memory and general-purpose registers that kernel 
malware access through instructions like MOV and LEA, other types of system 
storage resources could also be visited and manipulated by kernel malware. CPU 
caches (e.g., TLB) dedicate registers and buffers of I/O controllers. Attackers have 
developed techniques that take advantage of these hardware resources to devise new 
attacks. For example, upon a system service (system call) invocation made by a user-
space process, Windows XP uses instruction SYSENTER (for Intel processor) to 
perform the fast transition from user space to kernel space. The entry point of kernel 
code (a stub function) is stored in a dedicated register called IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 
which is one of Model-Specific Registers (MSRs). When executing SYSENTER, the 
CPU sets the EIP register with the value of IA32_SYSENTER_EIP. Then, the kernel 
stub function is called and it transfers the control to the target system service. To 
compromise Windows system services, a rootkit could alter the system control-flow 
path by resetting the IA32_SYSENTER_EIP to the starting address of a malicious 
stub function, and this function can invoke a malicious system service. So, capturing 
the malware's accesses to these sensitive hardware resources could be essential to 
comprehend its attacking behavior. Currently, Rkprofiler monitors twenty system 
instructions that malware might execute. They are not meant to be complete at this 
point and can be expanded in the future if necessary.         
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4.8 Case Studies 
4.8.1 FUTo 
FUTo is an enhanced version of the Windows kernel rootkit FU, which uses the 
technique called Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) to hide processes and 
drivers and change the process privileges. DKOM allows rootkits to directly 
manipulate kernel objects, avoiding the use of kernel hooks to intercept events that 
access these kernel objects. For example, a rootkit can delete an item from the 
MODULE_ENTRY list to hide a device driver without affecting the execution of the 
system. This technique has been applied to many rootkit attacks, such as hiding 
processes, drivers and communication ports, elevating privilege levels of threads or 
processes and skewing forensics [47] In this experiment, FUTo was downloaded from 
[66] and it included one driver (msdirectx.sys) and one executable (fu.exe). The 
fu.exe was a command-line application that installed the driver and sent commands to 
the driver according to the user's instructions. During the test, we executed the fu.exe 
to accomplish the following tasks: querying the command options, hiding the driver 
(msdirect.sys) and hiding the process (cmd.exe). After that, we used Windows native 
system utilities (task manager and driverquery) to verify that the target driver and 
process did not show up in their reports. The test took less than 3 minutes. 













0 0xf6b7e7e6 FYBCT_0049_0953_DriverInit n/a function n/a 4 System 
1 0x825c3978 DRIVER_OBJECT n/a struct 168 4 System 
2 0x827cba00 EPROCESS n/a struct 608 4 System 
3 0x825991c8 EPROCESS 2 struct 608 4 System 
4 0x825ce020 EPROCESS 3 struct 608 4 System 
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5 0xf7b03c58 PVOID n/a pointer 4 4 System 
6 0xf6b9b92 PDEVICE_OBJECT n/a pointer 4 4 System 
7 0xf6b7e722 FUNCT_0049_095B_MajorFunction 1 function n/a 4 System 
8 0xf6b7d43a FUNCTION_00BC_0957_DriverUnload 1 function n/a 4 System 
9 0x82604600 MODULE_ENTRY 1 struct 52 4 System 
10 0x82609f18 DEVICE_OBJECT n/a struct 184 1920 Fu.exe 
11 0x8266fc28 IRP n/a struct 112 1920 Fu.exe 
12 0x8266fc03 IRP n/a struct 112 1920 Fu.exe 
13 0x826bc118 IRP n/a struct 112 1952 Fu.exe 
14 0x826bc103 IRP n/a struct 112 1952 Fu.exe 
15 0x826d8288 MODULE_ENTRY 9 struct 52 1952 Fu.exe 
16 0x8055ab20 MODULE_ENTRY 9 struct 52 1952 Fu.exe 
17 0x826bc210 IRP n/a struct 112 1952 Fu.exe 
18 0x825d1020 EPROCESS 4 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
19 0x8273a7c8 EPROCESS 18 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
20 0x826eb408 EPROCESS 19 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
21 0x825d5a800 EPRCOESS 20 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
22 0x825e4da0 EPRCOESS 21 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
23 0x825a9668 EPRCOESS 22 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
24 0x82695180 EPRCOESS 23 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
25 0x825a0da0 EPRCOESS 24 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
26 0x82722980 EPRCOESS 25 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
27 0x825c27e0 EPRCOESS 26 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
28 0x82624bb8 EPRCOESS 27 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
29 0x825de980 EPRCOESS 28 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
30 0x8248bda0 EPRCOESS 29 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
31 0x8264a928 EPRCOESS 30 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
32 0x8263a5a8 EPRCOESS 31 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
33 0x825d9020 EPRCOESS 32 struct 608 1880 Fu.exe 
34 0xe13ed7b0 HANDLE_TABLE 4 struct 68 1880 Fu.exe 
35 0x82607d48 ETHREAD 32 struct 600 1880 Fu.exe 
36 0xe15ca640 HANDLE_TABLE 32 struct 68 1880 Fu.exe 
37 0xe10a8a08 HANDLE_TABLE 36 struct 68 1880 Fu.exe 
38 0xe1747cd0 HANDLE_TABLE 36 struct 68 1880 Fu.exe 
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We compared the call graph created by Rkprofiler with the call graph created by 
IDA-pro (which uses the static code analysis technique). It was found that the former 
was the sub-graph of the latter, which is as expected. The tag trace table of the Futo is 
shown in Table 8 (Appendix B is the corresponding tag trace graph). The driver 
msdirectx was executed in four process contexts in the graph. Process 4 (System) is 
the Windows native process that was responsible for loading the driver misdirectx. 
The driver initialization routine (with tag ID 0) was executed in this process context. 
The other three processes were associated with FUTo.exe and they communicated 
with the misdirectx driver to perform the tasks of hiding the driver and process. One 
important observation is that the major attacking activities have been recorded by 
Rkprofiler and can be easily identified in the tag trace table by users. To hide itself, 
the driver msdirectx first reads the address of its module descriptor (with tag ID 9) 
from its driver object (with tag ID 1). Then it removes this module descriptor from the 
kernel MODULE_ENTRY list by modifying the Flink and Blink pointers in two 
neighbor module descriptors (tag ID 15 and 16). Similarly, to conceal process 
cmd.exe, msdirectx first obtains the process descriptor (with tag ID 2) of the current 
process by calling kernel function IoGetCurrentProcess. Starting from this process 
descriptor, msdirectx traverses the kernel EPROCESS list to find the process 
descriptor (with tag ID 4) of process csrss.exe. These two steps take place in the 
System process context. After receiving the command for hiding the cmd.exe process 
sent by one of the fu.exe processes, msdiretx searches the kernel EPROCESS list, 
beginning with the process descriptor of csrss.exe. When the process descriptor (with 
tag ID 32) of cmd.exe is found, msdirectx removes it from the kernel EPROCESS list 
by altering Flink and Blink pointers in two neighbor process descriptors (with tag ID 
31 and 33).  Furthermore, Flink and Blink pointers in the process descriptor of 
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cmd.exe are also modified to prevent the random Blue Screen of Death (BSOD) when 
exiting the hidden process. To evade the detection of rootkit detectors, FUTo deletes 
the hidden process from the other three kernel structures: kernel handle table list, 
handle table of the process csrss.exe and PspCidTable. The first one is a linked list, 
and the DKOM behavior of FUTo over this kernel structure was captured and 
displayed in the tag trace graph too (seetag ID 36, 37 and 38). The last two kernel 
structures are implemented as three-dimensional arrays, which is not supported by the 
current version of Rkprofiler. So, the tag trace graph does not include the 
modification of these two kernel structures. 
Combining Rkprofiler's output with other reports, we discovered other interesting 
behavior of FUTo. First, FUTo employed an IOCTL mechanism to pass control 
commands from user space to kernel space. During the driver initialization, a device 
\\Device\\msdirectx was created by calling the kernel function IoCreateDevice. Then 
a dispatch function (data type FUNCT_0049_095B_Majorfunction and tag ID 7) was 
registered to the driver object (with tag ID 1) that was assigned to msdirectx by the 
Windows kernel. This dispatch function was invoked by the kernel I/O manager to 
process I/O requests issued by the fu.exe processes. By checking the parameters of 
this dispatch function, we found that the I/O control codes for process and driver 
concealment tasks are 0x2a7b2008 and 0x2a7b2020. Second, the kernel string 
function strncmp was called 373 times by one msdirectx function, implying a brute-
force searching operation.  The first parameter of this function was constant string 
``System'' and the second parameter was 6 bytes of data within the process descriptor 
of the process System (with tag ID 2). Beginning with the address of the process 
descriptor, the address of the second parameter was increased by one byte each time 
this string function was called. The purpose of the search was to find the offset of the 
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process name in the EPROCESS structure. This was confirmed by manually checking 
the FUTo source. It seems that the definition of EPROCESS structure has changed 
over the Windows versions and the brute-force searching allows FUTo to work with 
different Windows versions.   
4.8.2 TCPIRPHOOK 
Inserting hooks into the kernel to tamper with the kernel control-flow path is one 
major technique that attackers apply to rootkit attacks. A hooked function can 
intercept and manipulate kernel data to serve its malicious aims. TCPIRPHOOK is 
one such rootkit and it intends to hide the TCP connections from local users. 
Specifically, this rookit exploits the dispatch function table of the TCP/IP driver 
object (associated with driver TCPIP.sys) and substitutes a dispatch function with its 
hook. The hooked function registers another hook to the I/O request packets (IRP) 
such that the second hook can intercept and modify the query results for network 
connections. We downloaded the rootkit package from [66] which also included one 
driver file, irphook.sys. The rootkit was implemented to conceal all http connections 
(with destination port 80). Before installing the rootkit, we opened Internet Explorer 
to visit a few websites, and then ran the netstat utility to display the corresponding 
http connections. We loaded the irphook.sys to the kernel and used netstat to verify 
that all https connections were gone. In the end, we unloaded the irphook.sys. The test 
took less than 3 minutes. 
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Fig. 6. TCPIRP call graph  
The call graph of TCPIRPHOOK is shown in Figure 6. Function 0xf7ab8132 
(irphook.sys) was the first hook that was inserted into the 14th entry 
(IRP_MJ_DEVICE_ CONTROL) of the dispatch function table in the driver 
TCPIP.sys. The replaced dispatch function was TCPDispatch (address 0xf726fddf ) 
owned by driver TCPIP.sys. The first hook invoked TCPDispatch 15 times in the call 
graph. In fact, it is common for rootkits to call the original function in a hook, which 
reduces the coding complexity of the hook.  Function 0xfa7b8000 (irphook.sys) was 
the second hook that was responsible for modifying the query results for network 
connections.  Although the second hook seems to be called by TCPDispatch in the 
call graph, the actual direct caller of the second hook was IopfCompleteRequest 
(ntoskrnl.exe). This is because Rkprofiler did not track the benign kernel code and 
had no knowledge of their call stacks.  On the other hand, even the indirect caller-
callee relation between TCPDisptch and the second hook can imply that the network 
connection query caused synchronous IRP processing and completion in the kernel, 
which is comparable to asynchronous IRP processing and completion. But this 
information cannot be inferred by simply looking at the call graph of IDA-pro, 
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because IDA-pro cannot statically determine the symbol of function TCPDispatch and 
the calling path from the first hook to the second hook in Figure 3 is not presented in 
the call graph of IDA-pro. 
 Fig. 7. TCPIRP tag trace graph  
Figure 7 is the tag trace graph of TCPIRPHOOK. Two hooking activities are 
illustrated in this graph. The first hook was installed at the driver loading stage. To 
hook the dispatch function table of the driver TCPIP.sys, TCPIRPHOOK first calls 
the kernel function IoGetDeviceObjectPointer with the device name\\Device\\Tcp to 
get the pointer (with tag ID 7) to the device object (withtag ID 8) owned by driver 
TCPIP.sys. Then, the device object was visited to get the address of the driver object 
(withtag ID 9) owned by driver TCPIP.sys. Last, TCPIRPHOOK carried out the 
hooking by accessing the 14th entry of the dispatch function table in the driver object: 
reading the address of the original dispatch function (with tag ID 10) and storing it to 
a global variable; writing the address of the second hook (withtag ID 11) to the table 
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entry. The second hook was dynamically installed in the context of process 
netstat.exe. When netstat.exe was executed to query TCP connection status, the 
Windows kernel I/O manager created an IRP (withtag ID 12) for the netstat.exe 
process. This IRP was passed to the first hook function_id 5 and tag ID 11) of 
TCPIRPHOOK. The first hook obtained the IO_STACK_LOCATION object (with 
tag ID 13) from this IRP and wrote the address of the second hook (withtag ID 14) to 
the data member CompletionRoutine of the IO_STACK_LOCATION object. Thus, 
being one IRP completion function, the second hook would be called by the Windows 
kernel to process the I/O return data for this IRP. Last, the tag trace graph also 
captures the manipulation of the I/O return data. The buffer of the I/O return data was 
pointed to by the data member UserBuffer of IRP and it was an array of structure 
CONNINF101 (withtag ID 15). The size of the buffer was stored in the data member 
IoStatus.Information of the IRP. Clearly, the tag ID 15 was modified in the tag trace 
graph. By examining the tag trace table, we found that the statuses of all http 
connections in the buffer were changed from 5 to 0. 
4.8.3 Shadow Walker 
Shadow Walker is a virtual memory subversion rootkit. It makes other kernel 
malware invisible to detectors by controlling virtual memory mappings. For read/wire 
virtual memory access, Shadow Walker presents a benign page of memory; for 
execute access on the same virtual address, it will execute the hidden code.  
Concretely, it replaces the page fault handler in the IDT with a hook and marks the 
hidden pages in the page table “not present”. When a hidden page is visited by CPU, a 
page fault exception is generated and passed to the hook of Shadow Walker. The hook 
compares the faulting address in CR2 with the instruction pointer in ESP: if they are 
equal, then it is a code access; otherwise, it is a data access. Then, the hook returns a 
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mapping to either the actual rootkit code or random data accordingly.  We 
downloaded the Shadow Walker from [66]. The download package contained two 
drivers: msdirectx.sys and mmHook.sys. The first one is Futo rootkit that Shadow 
Walker attempts to hide. The second one is the Shadow Walker driver. Because we 
just wanted to test the behaviors of Shadow Walker, Futo rootkit was treated as 
benign in the experiment. We first loaded msdirectx.sys and then started the 
rkprofiler's monitoring function. Last, we loaded the mmHook.sys. No particular user-
space application was executed in this experiment.  
In the Rkprofiler reports, we found that some malicious code was executed 
periodically in the interrupt contexts. The IDT vector number was 14, indicating that 
the page fault handler was hacked. In addition, the following three system instructions 
were executed multiple times: SIDT, MVCR2 and INVLPG. SIDT was used by 
Shadow Walker to read the address of IDT and substituted the original page falut 
handler with the hook in IDT; MVCR2 allowed the hook to read the CPU control 
register 2 and get the faulting address upon a page fault exception; Shadow Walker 
used the INVLPG to flush a particular TLB entry and to synchronize the data TLB, 
code TLB and page tables.  As no data type definitions for page table and IDT were 
supplied to Rkprofiler, we do not expect the Rkprofiler can detect IDT hooking and 
page table manipulation in the experiment.   
 
4.8.4 Rustoc.B 
Rustock.B is a notorious backdoor rootkit that hides malicious activities on a 
compromised machine. The distinguished feature of this rootkit is the usage of multi-
layered code packing, which makes static analysis cumbersome [57]. Unlike the other 
two rookits described above, we did not have access to the source code of this rootkit. 
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However, several analysis results on this rootkit published on the Internet helped us 
understand some behaviors of this rootkit. We downloaded Rustock.B from [67] as 
one executable.  During the test, we just double-clicked the binary and waited until 
the size of the Rkprofiler log stop being populated. The test lasted about five minutes.  
Table 9. External functions and registry keys manipulated by Rustock.B 
External Functions 
ExAllocatePoolWithTag, ExFreePoolWithTag, ExInitializeNPagedLookasideList, 
IoAllocateMdl,  IoGetCurrentProcess,  IoGetDeviceObjectPointer, 
IoGetRelatedDeviceObject, KeClearEvent, KeDelayExecutionThread, 
KeEnterCriticalRegion, KeInitializeApc, KeInitializeEvent, KeInitializeMutex, 
KeInitializeSpinLock, KeInsertQueueApc, KeLeaveCriticalRegion, 
KeWaitForSingleObject, MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool, MmMapLockedPages, 
MmProbeAndLockPages, NtSetInformationProcess, ObfDereferenceObject, 
ObReferenceObjectByHandle, ProbeForRead, PsCreateSystemThread, 
PsLookupProcessByProcessId, PsLookupThreadByThreadId, 
RtlInitUnicodeString, _stricmp, _strnicmp, swprintf,  wcschr, wcscpy, _wcsicmp, 
_wcslwr, wcsncpy,  _wcsnicmp, wcstombs, ZwClose, ZwCreateEvent, 
ZwCreateFile, ZwDeleteKey,  ZwEnumerateKey, ZwOpenKey, 
ZwQueryInformationFile,  ZwQueryInformationProcess, 








A malicious driver named system32:lzx32:sys was detected by Rkprofiler. 90857 
calls and 2936 tags were captured in the test. The driver contained self-modifiying 
code and we found many RET instructions that did not have corresponding CALL 
instructions at code unpacking stages. This is because unpacking routines executed 
JMP instructions to transfer the controls to the intermediate or unpacked code. In 
addition, the driver modified the dedicated register IA32_SYSENTER_EIP through 
WRMSR and RDMSR instructions to hijack the Windows System Service Descriptor 
Table (SSDT). One hook was added to the dispatch function table of driver Ntfs.sys to 
replace the original IRP_MJ_CREATE dispatch function. This is similar to what 
TCPIRPHOOK does. We compared the report generated by Rkprofiler with others on 
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the Internet and they matched each other well.  Table 9 lists the external functions 
and registry keys that were called and created by Rustock.B.  
4.9 Discussion 
In addition to the incomplete kernel symbols provided by Microsoft, the current 
implementation of Rkprofiler suffers several other limitations that could be exploited 
by attackers to evade the inspection.  First, attackers may compromise the kernel 
without running any malicious kernel code, e.g., directly modifying kernel data 
objects from user space or launching return-to-lib attacks without the use of any 
function calls and malicious kernel code [68] [74].  Rkprofiler is not able to detect 
and profile such attacks. Instead, other defense approaches like control flow integrity 
enforcement [69] could be adopted to address them. Second, the instruction pair 
CALL/RET is used as the sole indicator of function call and return events. Attackers 
can obfuscate these function activities to escape the monitoring. For example, 
JMP/JMP, CALL/JMP and JMP/RET can be employed to implement the function call 
and return events. Moreover, instead of jumping to a target instruction (either the first 
instruction of a callee function or the returned instruction of a caller function), an 
attacker could craft the code to jump to one of its neighbor instructions, while 
preserving the software logic intact.  Defending against such attacks is part of our 
future work. Third, an attacker may deter the AMT method by accessing dynamic 
objects in unconventional ways. For example, a rootkit can scan the stack of a benign 
kernel function to get the pointer to a desired kernel object.  These attacks are very 
challenging, because building an accurate and up-to-date symbol table for all kernel 
objects is impractical. Last, malware may have the capability of detecting virtual 
machine environments and change their behavior accordingly. Min Gyung Kang [75] 
presents several countermeasures to address this problem.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Although kernel malware is a nightmare to security software running on regular 
physical machines, VM-based computing systems provide vital advantage to security 
software in the war against kernel malware: higher system privilege. By taking 
advantage of this, we designed and implemented two VM-based security systems in 
this research work to counter the kernel malware who run inside guest operating 
systems.  
DARK is a rootkit prevention system that applies on-demand emulation technique 
to dynamically monitor, detect and block suspicious LKMs. We created a group of 
state-of-art security policies for DARK. The evaluation results demonstrated that 
DARK was able to effectively defeat the Linux kernel rootkits that are available to us, 
while keeping the reasonable system performance. Rkprofiler is a rookit analysis 
system that thoroughly monitors and reports the behaviors of Windows kernel 
rootkits. In particular, aggressive memory tagging (AMT) is proposed to resolve the 
symbols of dynamic kernel objects. We used the Rkprofiler to analyze a number of 
real-world Windows rootkits, showing that substantial rootkit behaviors were revealed 
by Rkprofiler.  
However, as we pointed out in the Chapter 3 and 4, both DARK and Rkprofiler 
have limitations, so more research efforts are needed to address them down to the 
road. Here is list of future work:  
1. Find a way to help DARK user automatically identify the suspicious LKMs 
and trigger DARK’s monitoring. Driver signing and static driver analysis 
are two options for this purpose.  
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2. Further reduce the performance overhead caused by emulation and LKM 
monitoring in DARK, e.g., identifying the benign execution paths of a 
suspicious module.  
3.  Automate the security policy generation in DARK by applying data mining 
technique to automatically extract rules from the training set.  
4.  Explore new mechanism to accurately identify ambiguous data types 
(UNION, generic pointer and dynamic array), which could improve the 
symbol coverage of Rkprofiler significantly.   
5.  Design new method to reliably detect function call and return events in 
Rkprofiler, increasing the resistance to evasion techniques possibly used by 
rookits, e.g., JMP/JMP pair. 
6.  Find proper technique to explore and profile the multiple execution paths of 
kernel malware, which is more challenging than that of user-space malware 
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APPENDIX A – Imbench TEST RESULT 
 
 
Processor, Processes - times in microseconds - smaller is better 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
System               OS  Mhz null null      open slct sig  sig  fork exec sh   
                             call  I/O stat clos TCP  inst hndl proc proc proc 
--------- ------------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- --
-- 
VMM       Linux 2.4.18- 2184 7.39 7.61 195. 198. 67.1 7.67 106. 4807 13.K 34.K 
DARK-CS   Linux 2.4.18- 2184 7.24 7.63 189. 219. 67.3 7.67 104. 4925 13.K 
35.K 
DARK      Linux 2.4.18- 2184 7.34 7.60 190. 198. 66.2 7.87 107. 4943 13.K 
35.K 
 
Context switching - times in microseconds - smaller is better 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
System               OS  2p/0K 2p/16K 2p/64K 8p/16K 8p/64K 16p/16K 16p/64K 
                         ctxsw  ctxsw  ctxsw ctxsw  ctxsw   ctxsw   ctxsw 
--------- ------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------- ------- 
VMM       Linux 2.4.18-  140.8  164.1         189.0          201.8  
DARK-CS   Linux 2.4.18-  158.4  183.8         205.0          224.2    
DARK      Linux 2.4.18-  162.6  192.8         209.3          228.5       
 
*Local* Communication latencies in microseconds - smaller is better 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
System               OS 2p/0K  Pipe AF     UDP  RPC/   TCP  RPC/ TCP 
                        ctxsw       UNIX         UDP         TCP conn 
--------- ------------- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- 
VMM       Linux 2.4.18- 140.8 278.9 863. 891.5 1666. 1721. 2542. 3958 
DARK-CS   Linux 2.4.18- 158.4 273.8 866. 9810. 1985. 1981. 2643  3594 
DARK      Linux 2.4.18- 162.6 276.4 849. 9396. 2001. 1920. 2745  3676 
 
File & VM system latencies in microseconds - smaller is better 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
System               OS   0K File      10K File     Mmap    Prot   Page   100fd 
                        Create Delete Create Delete Latency Fault  Fault  selct 
--------- ------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------- ----- ------- --
--- 
VMM       Linux 2.4.18-  529.9  533.3 1447.2 1081.1   669.0  15.4    20.0  64.3 
DARK-CS   Linux 2.4.18-  510.7  552.8 1697.8  838.9   772.0  13.9    24.6  63.7 
DARK      Linux 2.4.18-  530.1  530.9 1579.0 1203.8   715.0  15.7    25.7  64.7 
 
*Local* Communication bandwidths in MB/s - bigger is better 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
System              OS  Pipe AF    TCP  File   Mmap  Bcopy  Bcopy  Mem   Mem 
                             UNIX      reread reread (libc) (hand) read write 
--------- ------------- ---- ---- ---- ------ ------ ------ ------ ---- ----
- 
VMM       Linux 2.4.18- 18.0 9.57 5.05 1506.2 1879.1  510.7  484.1 1262 950.0 
DARK-CS   Linux 2.4.18- 17.8 9.21 4.63 1291.5 1423.2  437.6  418.8 1195 904.7 








 88  
 













Born in Zhengzhou, China, Chaoting Xuan is one of the four children of Jiarang 
Xuan and Xiuying Zhu, both of whom are school teachers. In July of 1997, Chaoting 
graduated from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China, with B.S. degree in Material 
Science and Engineering. He came to United States in 2000 and started graduate 
studies here. Chaoting respectively received M.S. degree in Electrical and Computer 
Engineering from North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina in 2002, 
and M.S. degree in Computer Science from Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, 
Georgia in 2004. He was enrolled in the PhD program of the department of Electrical 
and Computer Engineering in 2006. Starting from 2004, Chaoting works for Trusted 
Network Technologies (acquired by Liquidware Labs) as software engineer until 
today. He married to Hua Tu in 2000 and they have two children: Henry and Grace.  
 
 
